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ABSTRACT 
 
Collective Action for Community-Based Hazard Mitigation:  
A Case Study of Tulsa Project Impact. 
(August 2004) 
Hee Min Lee, B.S., Kangwon National University, Korea; 
M. Arch., Texas A&M University  
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Donald A. Sweeney 
 
During the past two decades, community-based hazard mitigation (CBHM) has 
been newly proposed and implemented as an alternative conceptual model for 
emergency management to deal with disasters comprehensively in order to curtail 
skyrocketing disaster losses.  Local community members have been growingly required 
to share information and responsibilities for reducing community vulnerabilities to 
natural and technological hazards and building a safer community.  Consequently they 
are encouraged to join local mitigation programs and volunteer for collective mitigation 
action, but their contributions vary.  This research examined factors associated with 
Tulsa Project Impact partners’ contributions to collective mitigation action.  In the 
literature review, self-interest and social norms were identified and briefly discussed as 
two determinants to guide partners’ behavior by reviewing game theoretic frameworks 
and individual decision-making models.  Partners’ collective interest in building a safer 
community and feelings of obligation to participate in collective mitigation action were 
 iv
also considered for this study.  Thus, the major factors considered are: (1) collective 
interests, (2) selective benefits, (3) participation costs, (4) norms of cooperation, and (5) 
internalized norms of participation.  Research findings showed that selective benefits 
and internalized norms of participation were the two best predictors for partners’ 
contributions to collective mitigation action.  However, collective interests, participation 
costs, and norms of cooperation did not significantly influence partners’ contributions. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Problem Statement 
In 1997, Project Impact: Building Disaster Resistant Community was 
implemented as one of a few federal mitigation programs designed to facilitate 
community-based hazard mitigation (CBHM), and promote volunteer collective 
mitigation action (CMA) at the local community level.  Project Impact had inspired local 
communities to take positive action for change by changing attitudes and behavior and 
instituting a pre-disaster mitigation program.  Under Project Impact, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provided participating communities with 
technical and financial assistance (e.g., FEMA grants).  Participating communities were 
to initiate their own mitigation programs with the seed money, organize a core group, 
campaign to mobilize resources from various public and private sectors, set long-term 
mitigation goals, assess natural and technological hazards, facilitate rational decision-
making (e.g., scientific knowledge and social consensus basis), integrate fragmented 
mitigation efforts with day-to-day community life, fill in the gaps in the patchwork of 
regulatory enforcements, foster the development of social capital, communicate success 
stories, and gradually change the ways that communities organize to deal with disasters 
(Armstrong, 2000a; FEMA 2000; Geis, 2000; Krimm, 1998; Prater, 2001; Wachtendorf, 
2001).   
 This dissertation follows the style and format of Journal of the American Planning Association. 
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Contrary to FEMA’s original intention to help local communities initiate their 
own mitigation programs, local communities continuously struggled to maintain their 
initial momentum, sustain multiple-stakeholder involvement, and overcome 
organizational barriers (Nigg, Riad, Wachtendorf, Tweedy, and Reshaur, 1998; Tierney, 
2000; Wachtendorf, 2001; Wachtendorf, Riad, and Tierney, 2000; Wachtendorf and 
Tierney, 2001).  The Disaster Research Center (DRC) investigated seven Project Impact 
pilot communities in 1998, 1999, and 2000.  Its research findings showed that local 
communities commonly identified the critical problems such as competition with other 
community priorities, partners’ commitment to the program goals and activities, 
interagency communication and action, long-term funding sources, and public apathy.  
Especially, resource mobilization was one of the most critical issues associated with 
Project Impact and its implementation.  Local communities definitely needed personnel 
and other type of resources to launch the program and sustain its momentum.  The 
question was who was willing to pay costs for community-based hazard mitigation.  For 
example, time was the critical issue because Project Impact projects were extra jobs for 
them.  Project Impact partners were required to be passionate about the program and 
contribute significant amount of their time and effort to initiate the program.   
Thus, partners’ contributions of time and effort were selected to be the primary 
key issues for this study because many volunteer programs are subject to collective 
action problems.  Theoretically, rational self-interest individuals tend to free ride rather 
than cooperate.  Project Impact was also subject to collective action problems.  The 
Disaster Research Center (DRC) again investigated ten non-pilot communities in 2000 
2
  
and reported their partnership profiles in 2002 (Wachtendorf, Connell, Monahan, and 
Tierney, 2002).  According to this report, 74% of the total number of partners were 
identified as active, ranging from only 46% of partners in one community to over 80% 
of partners in three other communities.  Activity levels in the six remaining communities 
ranged from 63% to 79%.  The question stemming from these research findings, then, is 
what accounts for such differences, i.e., what motivates partners to sustain their 
contributions to the program activities of Project Impact or what factors create such 
differences among communities?   
In the disaster literature, collective action theory is mainly focused on providing 
generalizable explanations for some forms of emergent crowd behaviors associated with 
riots (McPhail, 1971), collective flights (Aguirre, Wenger, and Vigo, 1998) and mass 
assaults (Wenger and James, 1994) at specific social settings during the disaster or 
immediate post-disaster periods.  Some disaster scholars studied the effectiveness of 
interorganizational networks on improving local preparedness during the pre-disaster 
periods (Gillespie, Colignon, Banerjee, Murty, and Rogge, 1993) or the organizational 
effectiveness of Local Emergency Planning Committee (Lindell 1994; Lindell and 
Whitney, 1995).  However, there were few empirical studies of various forms of 
collective preventive action at the local community level during the pre-disaster period.   
This paper investigates the patterns of partners’ contributions to Project Impact 
which were launched to facilitate community-based hazard mitigation and identify 
factors influencing their contribution behavior.  In the collective action literature, 
rational choice theorists provided various conceptual models to explain an individual’s 
3
  
contribution behavior.  According to them, an individual’s decision (D) to volunteer for 
a collective action program can be defined as a function of three motivational 
predispositions to act: (1) rational choice; (2) normative conformity; and (3) affective 
social bonding (e.g., Decision (D) = Rational Choice*b1 + Normative Conformity*b2 + 
Affective Social Bonding*b3, Knoke, 1988).  Tulsa Project Impact (the former Tulsa 
Partners) was selected as a case for an investigation of collective action because of its 
reputation as one of the most successful Project Impact communities and its large 
number of partners - almost 400. 
 
1.2  Research Objectives 
 This study will examine the relationships of five determinants of collective action 
(specifically (1) collective interests, (2) selective incentives, (3) internalized norms of 
participation, (4) norms of cooperation, and (5) participation costs) with partners’ 
contributions to Tulsa Project Impact which was established as a community-based 
hazard mitigation organization in 1998.  
 The study objectives are: 
• To test the relationships between partners’ collective interests and their 
contributions 
• To test the relationships between partners’ perceptions of selective benefits and 
their contributions 
• To test the relationships between partners’ internalized norms of participation in 
the local mitigation program activities and their contributions 
4
  
• To test the relationships between partners’ agreement with the norms of 
cooperation and their contributions 
• To test the relationships between partners’ perceptions of selective costs and their 
contributions 
  
1.3  Anticipated Benefits of the Research 
 Research findings from this empirical study are expected to contribute to the 
scientific understanding of collective action for community-based hazard mitigation.  
First, it may help to determine the extent to which predictors better explain partners’ 
contributions to community-based mitigation programs to help estimate and develop 
contribution models for various forms of collective preventive actions.  Predictors can be 
grouped into three basic schools of rational choice, social bonds, and normative 
incentives (Oliver, 1993).  Almost all research of collective action may fall within these 
three schools, and the majority of collective action articles argue pro or con against those 
predictors and models.  Many parts of collective behaviors are well documented, 
scientifically proven, and explained by some important predictors and theories, but they 
still need more study.  Moreover, various collective action problems associated with 
disaster response or implementing community-based hazard mitigation often demand 
scientific evidence.  Thus, research findings may provide empirical evidence to identify 
predictors or models which better explain individuals’ contributing behaviors in specific 
community-based hazard mitigation contexts.    
5
  
In addition to its scientific contribution, this study will also provide practical 
benefits for local emergency managers, local mitigation program directors or 
coordinators, or other decision makers.  For example, contribution models may help 
clarify individuals’ collective behaviors and set strategies for overcoming collective 
action problems, mobilizing local resources, coordinating local hazard mitigation efforts, 
and eventually facilitating community-based hazard mitigation.  Thus, the major 
beneficiaries of this research will be local community-based mitigation program 
coordinators and emergency managers.   
 
1.4  Organization of the Dissertation  
 Chapter II will review the literature related to this research.  First, this chapter 
will briefly summarize the general background of community-based hazard mitigation.   
Second, it will briefly review previous research findings on collective action for disaster-
generated or disaster management relevant settings.  It will also look into the concepts, 
theoretical mechanisms, and determinants of collective mitigation action.  Finally, this 
chapter will identify determinants of collective action (e.g., collective interests, selective 
incentives, internalized norms of participation, norms of cooperation, and participation 
costs) based on previous research and theoretical mechanisms of collective action and 
relate them to individual contribution.  
 Chapter III will introduce and discuss rational choice theories and a collective 
interest model related to this research, and include social norms as predictors of 
collective action.  It will also develop rationale hypotheses from the literature review 
6
  
discussed in previous literature and a conceptual contribution model to test these 
hypotheses. 
 Chapter IV will address the study design, study area, population, and unit of 
analysis.  This chapter will describe research methods such as survey procedures and 
statistical analysis and will finish with the discussion of study variables and 
measurements.   
Chapter V will show analyses and findings testing these hypotheses.  It will 
discuss statistical analyses including scale reliability tests, descriptive statistics of 
variables, correlation analyses, independent-sample t tests, Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) tests, and hierarchical regression analyses to test the hypotheses.   
Chapter VI will provide conclusions from the major research findings of this 
study, contributions, implications, recommendations for future study, and study 
limitations.  
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 This chapter reviews the literature related to collective action for community-
based hazard mitigation. It seeks to identify the principal variables thought to influence 
individual partners’ contributions.  The first part of the study discusses recent trends in 
natural disaster losses and social causation of disaster losses.  The second section 
discusses the concept, definition, and characteristics of community-based hazard 
mitigation.  The third section describes the previous research findings associated with 
collective preventive action and the concept of collective action through game theoretic 
perspectives. 
 
2.2 Background of Community-Based Hazard Mitigation 
2.2.1 Recent Trends in Natural Disaster Losses 
Since 1950, the federal government has devoted a significant amount of time and 
effort to reducing natural disaster losses1. A variety of hazard mitigation policies and 
programs (e.g., Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, Flood Mitigation Assistance Program, 
                                                 
1 National Research Council (NRC, 1999) identified and discussed four basic concepts for disaster loss 
estimation: the impacts of a disaster, the losses of disasters, the costs of disasters, and the damages.  
According to NRC, the impact of a disaster is the broadest concept of loss estimation including both 
“market-based and non-market effects.”  For this study, however, this term will not be discussed because it 
will be treated as a general term defined as “the force or impetus transmitted by a collision” in discussion 
of the human-hazard interaction model later on.  Instead, disaster loss will be discussed in the broadest 
terms, including disaster cost and damage.  NRC defined disaster losses as “market-based negative 
economic impacts”, which consist of direct losses (e.g., physical destruction of buildings and crops) and 
indirect losses (e.g., unemployment).   
8
  
Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program, and National Flood Insurance Program) have been 
formulated, implemented, and renovated to improve intergovernmental governance and 
reduce disaster losses (Godschalk, Beatley, Berke, Brower, and Kaiser, 1999; Mileti, 
1999).  Nevertheless, natural disaster losses in the United States have dramatically 
increased rather than decreased during the past two decades (see Figure 2-1).  From 1975 
to 1998, natural disasters were estimated to cost over $300 billion in property and crop 
damage with nearly 9000 deaths (Mitchell and Thomas, 2002).  Federal government 
payouts alone averaged $4 billion between 1988 and 1997.  The federal government 
usually uses multi channels to provide federal disaster assistance effort.  Most are federal 
agencies such as the Small Business Association (SBA), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
(USACE), Department of Transportation (DOT), and the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA).  Since 1992, FEMA has taken the leading role in 
providing federal payouts (National Research Council, 1999).  From 1990 to 1999, 
FEMA alone spent more than US$25.4 billion for declared disasters and emergencies.  
This amount is almost 6.5 times higher than FEMA’s disaster costs (about US$3.9 
billion in current dollar value) from 1980 to 1989. 
Characteristically, overall death tolls resulting from natural disasters were 
curtailed between 1975 and 1998 thanks to accumulated scientific knowledge about 
hazard agents and the development of forecasting, warning, and communication 
technologies (Burby, 1998; Mileti, 1999).  However, property and economic losses have 
dramatically increased.  People can evacuate, but residential buildings and critical 
facilities remain within hazard prone areas.  Disaster losses have increased with the 
9
  
growing number of properties within hazard prone areas.  Kunreuther and Roth (1998) 
discussed the threshold that Property Claims Services revised to define a catastrophe.  
According to them, Property Claims Services set $1 million of insured, direct property 
damage as the threshold for a catastrophic natural event in 1949, but revised it to $5 
million in 1983.  In 1989, it reset the threshold at $25 million.  In 1997 they counted the 
number of major events only exceeding the thresholds set at the time between 1949 and 
1988 and the total amount of their disaster costs.  They compared them with those 
between 1980 and 1989.  A total of 933 major events resulted in costs of $22 billion 
between 1949 and 1988, but the 317 major events between 1989 and 1997 incurred costs 
of $79 billion.   
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Figure 2-1  Increasing trends – based on catastrophes that caused losses between $10 
million and $100 million – for five-year periods include the number of catastrophes, the 
amount of loss from these catastrophes, and the U.S. population. 
Source: Changnon et al. 1997. 
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During the past two decades, the United States has experienced multi-million 
dollar disaster losses almost annually and especially suffered from four multi-billion 
dollar disaster losses between 1989 and 1994: the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989, 
Hurricane Andrew in 1993, Midwest Floods in 1993, and the Northridge earthquake in 
1994.  Of course, a few catastrophic natural events were inevitable and the major reason 
for recently skyrocketing disaster losses (Armstrong, 2000a).  However, overall disaster 
losses have increased through the decades, and are expected to continue increasing due 
to social, economic, political, and cultural factors  (McEntire, 2000; Mileti, 1999; 
Mitchell and Thomas, 2001).   
 
2.2.2 Social Causation of Natural Disaster Losses 
What is a disaster?  What contributes to disaster losses?  There are several 
schools of disaster scholars who have contributed answers to this question.  
Geographers, political scientists, and social constructionists define disaster based on 
their own academic perspectives.  For example, geographers are primarily concerned 
about disaster agents’ physical entity (e.g., hurricane, flood, tornado, etc.), physical 
characteristics (e.g., in terms of magnitude, speed of onset, scope of impact, and duration 
of time), and consequences of physical impacts (e.g., saffir-simpson scale).  This paper 
takes a sociological perspective, viewing disaster as a social indicator of how vulnerable 
the human system is against natural and technological hazards in terms of hazards, social 
capacity, and social disruption.  If a category four hurricane lands on coastal areas 
without people or property, it is just a natural phenomenon.  Without social disruption, 
11
  
we cannot see it as a disaster.  So Fritz (1961) defined it as any event that is 
"concentrated in time and space, in which a society or a relatively self-sufficient 
subdivision of society, undergoes severe danger and incurs such loses to its members 
and physical appurtenances that the social structure is disrupted and the fulfillment of all 
or some of the essential functions of the society is prevented."  Barton (1969) also 
defined it as a type of collective stress situation in which “many members of a social 
system fail to receive expected conditions of life from a system.”  Similarly, Quarantelli 
(1998) defined it as a catastrophic situation by which normal life is severely disrupted.  
The human-hazard interaction model provides a useful framework to understand 
the dynamic mechanisms of disasters.  This model views natural disasters as a conflict 
between the earth’s physical system and the human use system, which can be moderated 
by hazard adjustments (Mileti, 1999; Mitchell and Thomas, 2002; White, 1974).  
Disaster occurs when extreme natural events bring massive destructive energy onto the 
human use system.  Those extreme natural events trigger chain impacts: direct and 
indirect impacts.  They cause the primary physical impacts on constructed physical 
environments such as residential buildings and critical facilities as well as directly 
generating human casualties.  The primary physical impacts are usually followed by 
secondary social and economic impacts on the human use system.  For example, 
breakdown of infrastructure may cause business disruption or losses, which in return 
cause an increase in unemployment and a decrease in local tax revenues.  So the human 
use system, with high vulnerability to hazards but low capacity to cushion that energy, is 
more vulnerable to hazards.  Even small natural events can result in catastrophic hazard 
12
  
consequences (Mileti, 1999).  Here, the term vulnerability can be defined as “the degree 
of loss to a given element at risk or set of such elements resulting from the occurrence of 
a phenomenon of a given magnitude” (Buckle, Mars, and Smale, 2000, p. 9) and 
expressed on a scale of 0 (no damage) to 1 (total loss).  The problem is that the social 
and economic sectors in contemporary human society are growing interdependently with 
each other, continually increasing community vulnerabilities to hazards.  Thus, it is 
critical to continually monitor the interactions and the changes among the earth’s 
physical system, the human-use system, and constructed system, and to inventory and 
mobilize local resources for hazard reduction.   
Decades ago, Gilbert White (1974) pinpointed the social causation of disasters: 
disaster is a man-made phenomenon.  The human use system inevitably collides with the 
earth’s physical system every time people expand their activity areas to meet spatial 
demands.  The growing number of people has steadily encroached on hazard-prone 
areas.  The demographic indicators of social vulnerabilities to natural hazards (e.g., 
population size, growth rates, composition, distribution, and mobility) confirm this trend.  
For example, population in the coastal counties of four states (Florida, Louisiana, North 
Carolina, and Texas, in which almost 60 percent of hurricanes landed from 1900 to 
1994) increased by 140 percent: from about 11.6 million people in the 1960 U.S. census 
to over 27.9 million in the 2000 U.S. census.  Many of them have never previously 
experienced hurricanes, so they tend to regard hurricanes as unlikely emergencies, and 
often take no action to protect their lives and properties.  
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Historically, people have settled in hazard prone areas such as riversides, coasts, 
slopes, and wetlands for transportation, defense, or agricultural purposes.  Most big 
cities and towns have been located and developed along the coasts and rivers because 
their floodplains provide rich soil for agriculture, flat slopes suitable for easy building 
construction, and cheap waterborne transport to facilitate trade and commerce (Mileti, 
1999).  Most of them are in scenic areas which are attractive places for human 
occupancy.  Thus, land development and immigration into these risky areas has always 
been tempting.  However, population growth, development, farming, deforestation, and 
growing land ownerships have resulted in increasing amounts of wetlands being 
destroyed.  Nationally, more than 50 percent of wetlands have been destroyed or 
developed for other purposes and in some states, more than 95 percent of wetlands have 
been affected (Hunt, Krabbenhoft, and Anderson, 1996).  Destroyed wetlands cannot 
function as natural sponges for flood waters.  Moreover, deforested lands cannot hold 
water flows, thus causing sediment induction into rivers raising the river-beds.  
Urbanization hardens land surfaces, and increase runoff.  Increased runoff again 
contributes to increasing the volume and velocity of water flows (Marsh, 1998; Mileti, 
1999).  The Midwest Floods of 1993 best demonstrate how unwisely used lands 
produced catastrophic hazard consequences.   
 
2.2.3 Community-Based Hazard Mitigation 
 During the past two decades, disaster scholars’ and practitioners’ primary 
concerns have slowly shifted to hazard mitigation as the cornerstone for emergency 
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management: how to facilitate proactive hazard mitigation approaches for substantially 
and permanently reducing community vulnerabilities to natural and technological 
hazards.  Hazard mitigation (see Table 2-1) is a kind of hazard adjustment aimed at 
eliminating a source of danger, reducing exposure to a hazard, or minimizing the 
magnitude of its deleterious impacts on social and economic activities and usually 
implemented during non-event periods (Burton, Kates, and White, 1978; Lindell, 
Alesch, Bolton, Greene, Larson, Lopes, May, Mulilis, Nathe, Nigg, Palm, Pate, Pine, 
Tubbesing, and Whitney, 1997; White, 1974).  Community-based hazard mitigation 
(CBHM) refers to more comprehensive, holistic hazard mitigation approaches which are 
able to vertically (e.g., federal, state, and local levels) and horizontally (e.g., public, 
private, and voluntary sectors) integrate potential stakeholders’ mitigation efforts at the 
local community level rather than rely on a few single professional channels related to 
emergency management for problem solving (Geis, 2000).  In fact, it is obviously 
beyond local emergency managers’ ability to inventory social vulnerability indicators, 
collect and update data, monitor their changes, and guide preventive actions (Gillespie, 
1991).   
 New alternative conceptual models for community-based hazard mitigation 
(CBHM) have recently been developed and implemented: for example, the sustainable 
community (Aguirre, 2002; Beatley, 1998; Berke, Kartez, and Wenger, 1993; Mileti, 
1999; Schwab, Topping, Eadie, Deyle, and Smith, 1998; Twigg, 2001) and the disaster 
resilient community (Armstrong, 2000a, 2000b; Geis, 1996, 2000; Krimm, 1998; 
McEntire, 2000; Prater, 2001; Wachtendorf, 2001).  The ultimate goal of these 
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conceptual models is to make at-risk communities better and safer by changing people’s 
attitudes and behaviors.  These models commonly have some basic key elements of 
community-based hazard mitigation such as people’s participation and resource 
mobilization, hazard assessments, scientific knowledge-based decision making, 
prioritization of local mitigation needs and tasks, identification of community-specific 
hazard mitigation measures, plus linkages with outside resource holders (Victoria, 2002).  
 
Table 2-1  Definitions of hazard mitigation 
Source Definitions 
The Stafford Act  
(44 CFR 206:401) 
“…sustained action taken to reduce or eliminate the long-term risk to 
human life and property from natural hazards.”   
FEMA “…the ongoing effort to lessen the impact disasters have on people's 
lives and property through damage prevention and flood insurance.”   
National Research 
Council (1991) 
“…actions taken to prevent or reduce the risk to life, property, social and 
economic activities, and natural resources from natural hazards.”   
Mileti (1999) “…policies and activities that will reduce an area’s vulnerability to 
damage from future disasters.” 
 
 
2.2.4 Why Community-Based Approaches? 
Previously, various hazard mitigation plans and policies (e.g., Hazard Mitigation 
Grant Program and National Flood Insurance Program) were formulated, implemented, 
and renovated to improve intergovernmental governance and reduce natural hazards 
(Godschalk, Beatley, Berke, Brower, and Kaiser, 1999).  However, research findings 
continue to show a gap between the social scientists’ recommendations for mitigation 
planning practices and what has actually been applied to hazard reduction (Alesch and 
Petak, 2001; Armstrong, 2000a; May and Burby, 1997; May and Williams, 1986; Mileti, 
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1999).  This gap shows that hazard mitigation policies and programs have often failed to 
overcome local barriers.  For example, the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) 
was started by the federal government in 1968 to reduce repeated flood disaster losses.  
Nationwide more than 19,000 communities joined the National Flood Insurance Program 
by 2001, but only about 900 of them joined the Community Rating System (CRS), 
which was designed to encourage communities to comply with FEMA requirements.  
According to the National Weather Service, flood disasters remain a major problem and 
cost the United States approximately $5.2 billion annually between 1980 and 1990.  
Moreover, flood insurance results in officially giving developers and property owners 
permission to develop within hazard prone areas, encouraging development within those 
risky areas rather than reducing flood disaster losses (Larson and Plascencia, 2001).   
 Local government is one of the biggest stakeholders for building safer 
communities and protecting civilians’ lives and properties, but it often fails to comply 
with federal and state mitigation policies.  May and Williams (1986) identified and 
discussed several reasons for this.  First, most local governments lack the capacity to 
thoroughly implement those policies (May and Burby, 1997).  Most local communities 
are primarily concerned about the impact of hazard mitigation on economic 
development.  They believe that hazard mitigation is “restrictive, costly, and first of all 
incompatible with their economic development goals” (NRC, 1991).  So they prefer 
disaster relief or structural mitigation, which may create minimum economic impacts.  
However, disaster relief is costly but does little to control long-run growth of disaster 
losses.  Structural mitigation provides only temporal prevention, but gives people a false 
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sense of security which can lead to catastrophic consequences.  Second, local 
bureaucrats are afraid of potential blame when mitigation plans and policies fail, while 
politicians are more interested in other politically sensitive issues such as crime and 
education.  Berke (1998) found that most local decision-makers are aware of natural 
hazards, but their hazard awareness does not necessarily lead them to taking preventive 
action.  In the private sector, lack of hazard awareness, optimism about hazard 
consequences, and public apathy also cause inaction (Auf Der Heide, 1989; Mileti, 
1999).  For example, “a disaster cannot happen to me” attitude accounts for population 
inaction.  Marginally profitable small businesses often lack resources or are too busy to 
take preventive action.  Consequently, hazard mitigation almost always takes low 
priority in local political agendas (Prater and Lindell, 2000), usually being implemented 
after disaster strikes (Birkland, 1997; Mileti, 1999).   
 The very purpose of community-based hazard mitigation models is to overcome 
such local barriers and encourage stakeholders to take proactive actions for hazard 
reduction.  Two concepts are identified for community-based hazard mitigation 
approaches.  The first one is that hazard mitigation should be implemented with 
localities, not for localities.  This notion stemmed from the growing consensus among 
disaster scholars and practitioners that local communities should be taken as the primary 
focus of attention for hazard reduction because: 1) every disaster is local; 2) a local 
community is often a common unit for responding to disasters; and 3) a local community 
knows best what it needs for hazard reduction (Henstra, 2003; Mileti, 1999).  Thus, local 
communities should actively take a leading role to facilitate rational hazard management 
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systems, not just passively join federal mitigation programs.  Communities need to 
conduct hazard assessments themselves, identify and assess local mitigation needs, and 
develop and implement their own community-wide hazard mitigation plans and policies.  
The role of the federal government is restricted to providing financial and technical 
support as a partner for local communities to achieve their common mitigation goals.  
The second notion is that all stakeholders in hazard-prone communities should 
share both risk exposure and mitigation responsibility (Comfort, 1999).  This notion 
stems from the following premises that: 1) today almost all social, economic, and 
environmental sectors are becoming more and more interdependent, so they are highly 
vulnerable to hazards; 2) individuals or any single business cannot be safe without 
community safety (Geis, 2000); and 3) ethically, risk generators and distributors should 
take the primary responsibility for taking preventive action (Beatley, 1994).  For 
example, a great number of small businesses suffered from the 1994 Northridge 
Earthquake because they experienced severe business disruption or had to close due to 
the breakdown of lifelines even when they had no direct physical impact.  In the 1992 
Hurricane Andrew, building code violation resulted in catastrophic hazard consequences.  
Such damages could be reduced if appropriate preparedness and mitigation measures 
were properly implemented or buildings were thoroughly inspected by relevant 
authorities.   
Such notions of community-based hazard mitigation stem from strong ethical 
grounds in which human activities and uses of natural resources should be compatible 
with surroundings or adjacent use including future use (Aguirre, 2002; Beatley, 1994, 
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1998).  Historically, urban growth has occurred in hazard-prone areas with little 
consideration given to its impact on ecological systems and increased vulnerability to 
hazards.  These ongoing destructive patterns of land development collectively generate 
various types of externalities and liabilities which again contribute to soaring and 
repetitive disaster losses.  The chain of disaster losses generates moral concerns because 
they are unethical, and localities should take the primary responsibility for them.      
Similarly, Beatley (1998) stated that the vision of sustainable development is the 
moral statement about how we should be living on the planet.  Community-based hazard 
mitigation can facilitate a proactive process capable of regenerating and reproducing a 
better pattern of disaster management over time to prevent harm.  It emphasizes 
individuals’ ethical obligation to the community, the environment, and future 
generations.  Thus, stakeholders should be encouraged to voluntarily participate in 
collective action as owners and producers for reducing community vulnerability.  They 
can help identify local mitigation needs, prioritize mitigation strategies based on needs 
identification, mobilize resources to match mitigation needs, channel resources to local 
mitigation projects, and share accountability (Gillespie, 1991; Mileti, 1999; Schwab, 
Topping, Eadie, Deyle, and Smith, 1998).   
 
2.3 Collective Action for CBHM 
A growing number of local communities have set sustainable community or 
disaster resilient community as their common mitigation goal to encourage community 
members to voluntarily participate.  Such long-term mitigation goals can be achieved 
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only when stakeholders: 1) join local mitigation programs as a partner, 2) agree on goals, 
tasks, and responsibilities, and 3) share the same willingness, motivation, commitment, 
and desire to openly and steadily share their resources and experiences in concert.  
Benefits from joining collective action for community-based hazard mitigation (CBHM) 
are obvious: improved efficiency¸ cost-effectiveness, and reducing duplicated mitigation 
efforts (Gillespie, Colignon, Banerjee, Murty, and Rogge, 1993).  Thus, stakeholders in 
hazard-prone communities are encouraged to participate in community-based hazard 
mitigation programs for making their community safer.  This subsection briefly 
discusses collective action problems associated with such participation. 
 
2.3.1 CBHM as Collective Good 
Böhm-Bawerk (1962, p.39) defined goods as “those things which serve human 
beings as the means and tools for the attainment of their personal well-being.” 
Community-based hazard mitigation (CBHM) as a collective good is implemented to 
serve local community members as a means to protect their lives, businesses, and 
properties from disasters and to improve the quality of life.  Reddy (2000) argues that 
hazard mitigation as a collective good can be defined by three elements: non-
excludability, jointness of supply, and non-rivalry (Barry and Hardin, 1982; Erev and 
Rapoport, 1990; Oliver, 1993; Olson, 1965; Burgess and Robinson, 1969; Taylor, 1978).  
For example, Cowen (1988, p. 3-4) said, “Non-excludability refers to the impossibility 
of preventing non-paying individuals from enjoying the benefits of a good or service.”   
It is not possible to exclude anyone from sharing in the collective good once it has been 
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demanded.  Community-based hazard mitigation cannot exclude non-contributors from 
enjoying benefits such as community safety.  For example, marginally profitable small 
businesses, which are assumed to lack time and resources to join community-based 
hazard mitigation, may still enjoy collective benefits from improvement of lifelines such 
as water, gas, and electric facilities.  Secondly, the costs of private goods must be 
proportional due to their scarcity and market demands.  This is called zero jointness of 
supply.  As seen with bridges or roads, however, a collective good costs the same no 
matter the number of individuals enjoying it.  Similarly community safety does not put 
an additional charge on stakeholders at risk or disaster victims because safety cannot be 
reduced by another individual consumption.  Finally, Cowen (1988, p. 3-4) again said “ 
Non-rivalrous consumption refers to cases in which individuals’ ability to consume a 
good or service is not diminished by allowing additional individuals to consume it.”  
Rational self-interested individuals compete for private goods, but free rides avoid 
rivalry for collective goods in the market.   
 
2.3.2 What Is Collective Mitigation Action? 
 Generally the term collective action refers to anything people do together.  Since 
Olson (1965) in his book the Logic of Collective Action defined collective action as 
actions which provide a shared good, most social scientists have used his definition.  For 
example, Bogdanor (1987, p 113) defined collective action as actions taken by a group 
of people “to further their common interest.”  Oliver (1984, 1993) and Oliver and 
Marwell (1993) defined it as any actions “in pursuit of collective goods.”  Elster (1985) 
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also discussed collective action as “the choice by all or most individuals of the course of 
action that, when chosen by all or most individuals, leads to the collectively best 
outcomes.”  He again defined the course of action as “cooperative behavior.”   
For this study, the term collective mitigation action (CMA) will be defined and 
used to clarify collective preventive actions because collective action itself refers to any 
group action.  The term needs to be specified for hazard mitigation settings as a specific 
social setting during the pre-disaster period.  This paper defines collective mitigation 
action as preventive actions taken by a group of people to achieve common mitigation 
goals such as building a disaster resilient (or resistant) community.  So collective 
mitigation action narrowly means group work in which all disaster stakeholders are 
invited to participate voluntarily and collectively take preventive actions for reducing 
community vulnerabilities to both natural and technological hazards or eliminating long-
term risks.  Broadly, collective mitigation action, however, may imply all the concerted 
efforts and agreements of federal, state, and local disaster stakeholders in a hazard-prone 
community, acting both independently and in groups to produce and distribute collective 
goods and services to all those in the community in order to further their common 
interests and mitigation needs.   
 
2.3.3 Previous Studies of Collective Preventive Action 
 In the disaster literature, many disaster scholars studied the non-institutionalized 
emergent forms of collective behavior such as mass assault (Hull and Wenger, 1992; 
Mileti and O’Brien, 1991; Wenger and James, 1994) and collective flight (Aguirre, 
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Wenger, and Vigo, 1998) in the specific social settings generated during disaster or 
immediate post-disaster periods.  It is a well-known social phenomenon that people 
volunteer for searching and rescuing disaster victims.  It was relatively well documented 
who volunteers or what motivates them.  Disaster scholars questioned why people joined 
such collective behaviors in that specific situation and what made their behaviors 
different.  For example, they studied the demographic characteristics of volunteers and 
their underlying psychological motivations (Wenger and James, 1994).  Some volunteers 
may coverage on a scene through their proximity to the event.  Some disaster scholars, 
including Dynes and Quarantelli (1980) and Kreps and Borsworth (1994), identified and 
classified the types of volunteers in the disaster-generated settings in various ways: for 
example, typologies of the extending, expanding, and emerging forms of volunteers 
based on their roles and tasks related to disaster response.     
 However, there were few empirical studies asking why so many individuals and 
organizations voluntarily participate in collective action for community-based hazard 
mitigation in social settings during the normal daily pre-disaster period.  Although their 
study was not focused on mitigation settings, Gillespie and his colleagues’ (1993) study 
of interorganizational partnerships for disaster preparedness among disaster service 
organizations and disaster relevant organizations in the St. Louis metropolitan area 
provide useful information to guide this study.  They identified and discussed critical 
factors which create and maintain interorganizational relationships.  According to them, 
partners’ awareness of hazards, coordination, resources, formal contact, informal 
contact, and individual personality were critical for forming interorganizational 
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relationships.  Particularly, informal and formal contacts are the two best reasons for 
organizations to link.  Many organizations initiated their relations with informal sporadic 
verbal contacts, and were more likely to develop formal relations with written 
agreements later on (Gillespie, Colignon, Banerjee, Murty, and Rogge, 1993; Mulford, 
1984).  Many organizations also contacted other organizations to obtain hazard 
information and hazard adjustment information, and clarify issues of legal liability.  
Some of them developed new relationships developing hazard awareness.  In addition, 
many organizations attempted to formulate new relationships to obtain resources 
(Galaskiewicz, 1985).  Second, they addressed attention to organizational needs, formal 
and informal contacts, and attitudes of organizational representatives as critical factors 
for partners to sustain their relationships.  If they find no more problems, their 
relationships are more likely to end; that is to say, their relationships are more likely 
maintained when partners agree on goals and tasks and share common interests 
(Mulford, 1984).  The relationships are more likely to be maintained if representatives 
share the same philosophies and values, or have good personal relationships.   
 In addition, a group of disaster scholars including Lindell (1994) and Lindell and 
Whitney (1995) studied the program effectiveness of Local Emergency Planning 
Committees (LEPC) for disaster preparedness.  In 1986, the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right to Know Act (Title III of the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act or SARA Title III) mandated formation of LEPCs to plan for 
emergency response to catastrophic chemical release.  In fact, LEPCs were different 
from other community-based hazard mitigation programs such as Showcase Community 
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or Project Impact in terms of goals and purposes for its formulation, hazard types, 
resource mobilization, and tasks (see Table 2-2).  For example, LEPCs were specifically 
focused on chemical hazards, while Project Impact addressed multi-hazards including 
technological hazards.  The main goal of the LEPC was to protect civilians from a 
chemical release, while that of Project Impact was to build a safer community.  The 
biggest difference between them was implementation modes: LEPC was mandatory for 
local communities and local chemical industries, while Project Impact was voluntary for 
local communities and stakeholders.  Thus, the patterns of members’ contribution to 
both programs may be different.  Nevertheless, the research of LEPC members’ 
contributions provides opportunities to explore the psychological characteristics of 
members who participated in the collective preventive action.  Both had to mobilize and 
rely on local resources for program implementation. 
 Morbley (1977) found that team climate in terms of member’s perception of team 
tasks and conditions is related to job satisfaction.  James, James and Ash (1990) also 
found that team climate had significant impacts on individual behaviors and motivations.  
An individual’s behavior is positively related to his aroused motivation directed toward 
group goals (Steers and Porter, 1987).  Lindell (1994) again emphasized that team 
climate is important because LEPCs rely on volunteers’ contributions of time and 
resources.  Thus, participation costs such as role conflict, role stress, role overload, or 
family obligation are negatively related with their performance.  He also identified 
reward opportunities such as job challenge, job significance, role clarity, and workgroup 
cooperation, team pride, and leader supports as critical factors influencing their 
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performance.  Whitney (1993) identified members’ organizational commitment, 
effective leadership, and members’ perception of their own competence as other critical 
factors influencing their performance.        
 
Table 2-2  Comparisons of Project Impact with Local Emergency Planning Committees 
 Local Emergency Planning Committee
(LEPC) 
Project Impact 
(PC) 
Year 1986 1997 
Causal Accident Bhopal Chemical Accident in 1984 Natural Disasters in 1990s’ 
Hazard Type Technological Natural Hazards 
Agency Congressional Mandate FEMA 
Current Status On Off 
Target Local Community Local Community 
Implementation Mandatory Voluntary 
Financial Support No Yes (but “NOT” to all communities) 
Participants Various Various 
Goals Protect Civilian from Chemical Release Building a Disaster Resilient Community 
Objectives To enhance the effectiveness of 
communities’ chemical hazard mgt. 
To facilitate community-based 
approaches for hazard reduction 
Tasks Community emergency plans for 
catastrophic chemical release 
Partnership development, hazard 
assessment, prioritization of mitigation 
projects, and communication of success 
stories as FEMA instructed   
 
 
     In summary, previous research was focused on collective behaviors in specific 
social settings during the disaster or post-disaster periods or preparedness settings during 
the pre-disaster period.  There was little previous empirical research focused on what 
accounted for partners’ contributions to collective action in a specific social setting of 
the community-based hazard mitigation program during the pre-disaster period.   
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2.3.4 Social Settings for Collective Mitigation Action 
 Individuals’ motivation to participate in collective action varies depending on the 
situational characteristics of social settings.  For example, emergent norms may guide 
volunteers’ behavior in the disaster-generated social settings, whereas individual goals 
and interests more likely influence the same volunteers’ decision making to participate 
in collective mitigation action during the pre-disaster period.  In the disaster literature, 
two specific social settings are identified: society during the disaster or the immediate 
post-disaster period and society during the pre-disaster period.  This section briefly 
discusses what accounts for differences between the pre-disaster social setting and the 
disaster or post-disaster social settings.  It will help to understand the social settings for 
collective mitigation action.  Ferdinand Tonnies discussed two concepts of society: 
Gemeinschaft and Gesselshaft (Flanagan, 1993).  In German, Gemeinschaft is close to 
the English term community, which can be characterized by traditional practices and a 
personal sense of belonging, while Gesselshaft is the more individualistic, competitive, 
and impersonal organization of society.  Both coexist in human society, but disaster 
increases individuals’ sense of belonging to their family and community and their sense 
of responsibility toward others.  For example, people usually search and rescue their 
family members and relatives first, but also expand their sense of responsibility towards 
other acquaintance or neighbors and volunteer for collective behaviors to search and 
rescue disaster victims.  After a disaster, however, individuals are back to normal, 
pursuing individual goals and interests.   
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Similarly, Emil Durkheim discussed two descriptive concepts of social 
formation: a society with mechanical solidarity and a society with organic solidarity 
(Giddens, 1972).  Durkheim defined mechanical solidarity as social cohesion based upon 
the likeness and similarities among individuals in a society, and organic solidarity as 
social cohesion based upon the dependence individuals in more advanced societies have 
on each other.  In the less-developed communities, this mechanical solidarity is created 
on the basis of the consensus of the same value and norm systems (as in religious 
groups).  Organic solidarity arises from mechanical solidarity when certain social 
segments change their functions because of a growing need to rely on neighboring 
segments.  Reliance on neighboring segments also creates a bond and a moral tie.  In 
modernized society, the growing number of social segments is connected, specialized, 
and diversified.  Each social member plays a distinct role in the functioning of society.  
Consensus among social members on the same values and norm systems decreases as the 
society is industrialized and individualized and social functions are diversified and 
specialized.  With disaster impacts, however, modern society constructed on the basis of 
organic solidarity is drastically changed into a society more oriented to mechanical 
solidarity.  Social distinctions are temporarily leveled out as the society’s structure is 
changed into what Turner (1961) called “communita.”  Each member’s social role 
becomes extremely simplified and unstructured due to the massive social disruption.  
Rather each member has to deal with unfamiliar tasks and agendas to adjust to both 
disaster and community generated demands.  Consensus among individuals on the 
values and altruistic social norms grows, and new norms emerge and guide their 
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behaviors (Turner and Killian, 1972).  After the event, however, mechanical solidarity is 
changed back into organic solidarity.  People’s concerns about disaster related issues 
quickly decrease and the window of opportunity for hazard mitigation is shut down.  As 
discussed, it is difficult to implement hazard mitigation measures at the local community 
level after the window of opportunity closes (Birkland, 1997).  Table 2-3 below 
summarizes and compares these concepts. 
 
Table 2-3  Comparisons of the types of social formation 
 Traditional Community Modernized Society 
 Disaster/ Post-Disaster Period Pre-Disaster Period 
Ferdinand Tonnies  Gemeinschaft 
     House or Village 
     Kinship, Inherited Status…. 
Gesselshaft 
     Town, City, Nation, World… 
     Contract, Competency… 
Emil Durkheim  Mechanical Solidarity 
     Social cohesion based on 
     the same value and norms 
Organic Solidarity 
     Social cohesion based on 
     the social roles and function    
Turner  Communita 
     Emotion 
Structure 
     Reason  
 
 
2.4 Problems of Collective Action 
During the past decades, collective action scholars have been primarily 
concerned about providing generalizable explanations for why so many rational, self-
interested individual actors choose to join voluntary groups and make substantial 
contributions to producing collective goods while others free ride, and why a certain 
group of people achieves their common goals while others cannot.  Most social scientists 
had taken it for granted that people collectively act on shared common interests until 
Olson (1965) made his controversial arguments (Oliver, 1993).  According to him, 
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rational self-interested individuals would not make voluntary contributions to producing 
collective goods such as roads, dams, bridges, sewage systems, cleaning streets, street 
safety, hazard mitigation, etc.  Rather they are motivated to free ride on the contributions 
of others because those collective goods cannot be withheld from non-contributors and 
because individuals always try to maximize their utilities and choose the higher payoffs.  
Thus, shared interests may not sustain common efforts.  Olson again argued that 
selective benefits are needed to overcome free riding.  Collective action is less likely to 
fail if the group size is sufficiently small, the group is privileged, or tangible selective 
benefits are offered to participants for collective action.  Rational self-interested 
individuals contribute only because of those selective benefits, and collective goods are 
by-products of their contribution.   
Olson’s theories of group size and selective benefits have been under attacks by 
many collective action scholars and are often criticized as too general to explain 
different types of complex social phenomena.  For example, Olson’s theories fail to 
explain why so many people join voluntary programs, the participation costs of which 
often exceed payoffs.  In reality, the rate of free riding is smaller than expected (Harrison 
and Hirshleifer, 1989).  Data showed that a growing number of U.S. citizens are making 
more contributions to community-based organizations than expected (Putnam, 2000).  In 
addition, Morrison and Tilock’s (1979) empirical findings showed that group size did 
not influence individual contributions.  Research findings showed that social ties or 
normative incentives are stronger effects on behavior in some specific social settings.   
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Erev and Rapoport (1994) identified and discussed the three most controversial 
issues related with collective action in the collective action literature.  They are listed 
below.   
• “Individuals act on their interests, choosing actions only when their (expected) 
benefit exceeds their (expected) cost.” 
• “Although participation is costly for an individual, the goal that a group can 
attain if its members cooperate is beneficial for these same members.” 
• “Individuals take into account the effect of other individuals’ choices in 
deciding.” 
 These issues are relatively well documented in the collective action literature, but 
still need more confirmation in order to explain collective preventive action in the non 
disaster-generated social settings.  This study will address these three issues especially in 
the community-based hazard mitigation setting.  This section briefly identifies and 
discusses the problems of collective action through game theoretic perspectives and 
decision-making perspectives. 
 
2.4.1 Game Theoretic Perspectives 
 Game theories provide useful theoretical frameworks to understand collective 
action problems (e.g., why people free ride), and help us identify and anticipate 
individuals’ most likely strategies in their interactions with others for collective action 
(e.g., why people cooperate rather than defect).  These theoretical frameworks also help 
explain the mechanisms of social norms emerging from the interactions.  For this study, 
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three types of games are identified, reviewed, and briefly discussed.  All Tulsa Project 
Impact partners were assumed to be rational and perceive community safety as a 
collective good.  All of them were also assumed to be equally informed about new 
projects or coming events and encouraged to volunteer for those activities.   
 
a. Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Olson’s collective action problem is often depicted by the prisoner’s dilemma 
(PD) game, in which two men who are arrested for robbing a bank are placed in separate 
isolation cells and have to make a decision whether to confess their crime before the 
prosecutor or remain silent.  Table 2-4 shows a typical (symmetric) prisoner’s dilemma.  
Rows and columns represent choices made by two prisoners (A and B).  Each cell shows 
the payoffs from a combination of row and column prisoners’ choices.  R refers to the 
"reward" payoff (token sentences on firearms possession charges) that each prisoner 
receives if both cooperate and remain silent.  P means the "punishment" (three years in 
prison for both early parole) that each receives if both defect and confess.  T is the 
"temptation" (all charges dropped against the confessor) that each receives if he alone 
defects and S is the "sucker" payoff (seven years in prison alone) that he receives if he 
alone cooperates.  Thus, payoffs have ordinal significance (T > R > P > S).  Now 
suppose the prisoner A cooperates.  Then, the prisoner B gets R for cooperating and T 
for defecting, and so is better off defecting (T > R).  On the contrary, suppose that 
prisoner A defects.  Then, prisoner B gets S for cooperating and P for defecting, and so 
is again better off defecting (P > S).  Thus, (P, P) is a unique Nash Equilibrium, in which 
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both players are worse off than they are in the action profile (R, R), but no player has 
incentive to unilaterally change his action.  Neither player can increase his payoff by 
choosing an action different from defection.  If both players are rational and self-
interested, they are better off choosing defection rather than cooperation whatever his 
opponent does.     
 
Table 2-4  Prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game 
B  
Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate R, R S, T A 
Defect T, S P, P 
R: Reward; S: Sucker; P: Punishment; and T: Temptation 
 
b. N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Garrett Hardin (1968) considered collective action as a prisoner’s dilemma 
between self and others.  He has provided the best example of the collective action 
problem called "the tragedy of the commons."  Suppose that a pasture is open to all 
neighboring herdsmen.  Each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the 
commons and maximize his gains (by adding more animals in the commons and selling 
them) unless he is irrational.  If all herdsmen rush to overgraze their cattle, it will bring 
ruin to all in the long run.  Similar to the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the n-person 
prisoners’ dilemma (NPD) games also make payoffs for each player.  It would pay each 
player R if all cooperate, P if all defect, and, if some cooperate and some defect, it would 
pay the cooperators S and the defectors T.  Table 2-5 shows a typical n-person’s 
dilemma game.  Suppose that fewer than n actors cooperate at the early stage of 
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collective action.  This represents a version of what has been called the "volunteer 
dilemma" (for example, calling the management office to report a power outrage at all 
units in the apartment complex).  Each player here will be better off if other players 
volunteer: it doesn't matter who does it, but everyone is in trouble if no one does it.  The 
row player (A) has to absorb the high cost, if he cooperates (the sucker payoff).  So, 
player A is better off defecting (0 > C).  Suppose that more than n actors cooperate.  
Each player can achieve some social benefit (B) if a sufficient number of actors pay the 
cost.  The "temptation" here is to get the benefit without the cost (B), while the reward is 
the benefit with the cost (C + B).  The punishment is to get neither B nor C + B.  Thus, 
player A is better off defecting (B > C + B).  So the payoffs are ordered: B > C + B > 0 > 
C.  Thus, defection still weakly dominates cooperation for all players just as in the two-
actor games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma.   
 
Table 2-5  N-person prisoner’s dilemma (NPD) game 
Cooperate  
n or fewer more than n 
Cooperate C C + B A 
Defect 0 B 
C refers to the cost, which is assumed to be a negative number, while B means Benefits. 
 
c. N-Person Repeated Game 
Both the prisoner’s dilemma and the n-person prisoner’s dilemma show how 
rational self-interested individuals have an incentive to choose defection.  In reality, 
however, a lot of people participate in the voluntary programs and contribute to 
producing collective goods.  Erev and Rapoport (1990) also argue that collective good 
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interactions are more appropriately modeled by other games than the prisoner’s 
dilemma.  In fact, models such as the n-person repeated game and a norm game better 
explain collective mitigation action, not a one-shot game like voting.  In those games in 
which the situation is repeated over time, defection is not a dominant strategy.  The 
payoff (P, P) is no longer the Pareto equilibrium as in the prisoner’s dilemma for both 
players.  In the repeated games, both players cooperate rather than defect.  They are 
interdependent and choose counter strategies depending on other actors’ moves.  Each 
player reacts to others’ strategies with two counter strategies: reward and punishment.  
Players reward cooperation with cooperation, and punish defection with defection.  
Thus, conditional cooperation is the best strategy for players in the repeated games.  In 
contrast, cooperation is strategically used as a trigger strategy to enforce cooperation.  
The best example of conditional cooperation is Tit for Tat.   
Voss (2001) discussed the mechanism of internal sanctions: how norms emerge 
in repeated interactions.  He utilized the concept of discount factor a (1 >  a > 0) what 
Axelrod (1984) called “the shadow of the future” to discuss it.  In the repeated games, 
players discount their future payoffs with this discount factor.  He defined the discount 
factor as “the actor’s (conditional subjective) probabilities that the iteration of the game 
will be continued for another period.”  The payoffs for the repeated game can be 
represented as weighted sums of the payoffs in each period.  When the game is repeated 
without limit, this discount factor becomes constant in each period, and future payoffs 
will be discounted exponentially.   
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R + aR + a2R + a3R + ….. = R/ (1 - a) 
 
If the discount factor a is large enough, players themselves create endogenous 
internal sanctions to cooperate: norms of conditional cooperation enforce players to 
cooperate rather than defect.  If the value of this discount factor is not enough to support 
cooperation, however, no Pareto-improving norm can be enforced.  However, 
cooperation costs those who sanction the defectors (negative or positive).  Collective 
action scholars including Oliver (1980), Axelrod (1986), and Heckathorn (1989) argue 
that there must be incentives to compensate the costs of cooperation which may generate 
the second-order collective action problem: who is willing to enforce norm deviators 
with sanctions.  In community-based hazard mitigation, it is volunteers        
In addition, players in the repeated game are less likely to cooperate as the group 
size increases (Olson, 1965; Voss, 2001).  In small groups, players tend to do their parts 
rather than taking advantage of others players’ contributions because a conditional 
cooperator monitors other players’ moves.  In contrast, it is difficult for a conditional 
cooperator to monitor other players’ moves as the number of actors grows.  In large 
groups, players are less likely to cooperate voluntarily in repeated games as Olson 
argued (Dawes, 1980; Taylor, 1976).  Moreover, a conditional cooperator may 
misperceive other players’ moves in large groups without understanding their underlying 
strategies.  Bendor and Mookerjee (1987) argued that players are more likely to defect in 
the n-person repeated games because of problems in monitoring, misperception, and 
uncertainty of the underlying strategies of other actors.   
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In Hardin’s the tragedy of the commons, herdsmen are more likely to cooperate 
to avoid the tragic consequence rather than defect.  They know the results when all 
defect, and that is the last outcome they want.  Norms of cooperation emerge among 
them and enforce them to set rules to guide their behaviors and conserve resource pools.  
But norms of cooperation do not occur only among norm beneficiaries.  Oliver (1984) 
identified and discussed those who were very skeptical about collective action more 
likely joined it.  They joined because they were concerned about situations in which no 
one participated and no collective good was produced.  In community-based hazard 
mitigation, norms of cooperation are expected to emerge among partners with high 
collective interests to guide partners to participate and cooperate in order to avoid or 
prevent catastrophic hazard consequences because catastrophic hazard consequences 
may be the expected outcome if all defect and take inaction.  This study will address this 
cooperation norm issue. 
 
2.4.2 Decision Making Perspectives  
 Determinants of collective action also vary depending on the nature of collective 
goods (Oliver, 1984) and individuals’ collective interests (Lubell, 2002).  The 
uncertainty of extreme natural events and collective interests (e.g., in terms of belief in 
program success, perceived collective benefits, and belief in an individual’s influence) 
are expected to influence individuals’ decisions to participate in collective mitigation 
action.   
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a. Individual Decision Making 
In the disaster literature, it is well documented that people are usually less 
concerned about making hazard adjustments in various social settings (e.g., individuals, 
organizations, or community) during the pre-disaster period than during the immediate 
post-disaster period.  People often perceive the benefits of hazard adjustments to be lower 
than their social benefits because they have limited information about hazards and 
effective hazard mitigation measures (Mileti, 1999).  Even the effectiveness of such 
precautionary preventive actions can only be evaluated by disasters, which rarely strike.  
These problems naturally lead to the dilemma of mismatches between low social 
demands (in terms of inaction) and low market supply (e.g., dilemma of disaster 
insurance companies).  Mileti again discussed various reasons (e.g., utility theory and 
heuristics) influencing individual decisions to take inaction.  Interestingly¸ he regarded 
the individual as a rational creature relying on norms to make decisions rather than a 
rational one as economists or rational choice theorists argued.  He said: 
 
Groups of individuals have social expectations about what should or 
should not be done in specific situations.  These norms become collective 
habits – the right thing to do under the circumstances.  They are not the 
outcome of thoughtful decisions intended to be adaptive adjustments to a 
particular hazard but are the result of people’s tendency to conform to the 
behavior of those around them.  This can lead to the adoption of hazard 
mitigation actions without any awareness of their value in adapting to the 
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physical environment.  This behavior is in sharp contrast to the more 
profound thought processes involved in assessing the expected utility of an 
adjustment based on the possible negative impacts of the physical 
environment.  This line of reasoning suggests that inducing people to take 
mitigation action is a problem of overcoming social conformity and 
encouraging innovation. (Mileti, 1999, p. 143). 
 
 In fact, most people conform to social norms without much thinking about it.  For 
example, most people tip in restaurants, raise their hand when wishing to speak in a 
group setting, or sit down when they eat.  While none of these incidences involve formal 
rules, most people comply with them.  However, this notion of conformity to norms is 
contrasted to other collective action theorists.  Zey (1998) discussed the key notion 
behind rational choice theory as “social interaction is basically an economic transaction 
that is guided in its course by the actor’s rational choices among alternative outcomes” 
(p. 2).  She argued that individuals are purposive and intentional; individuals intuitively 
try to maximize their utility or satisfy their needs and wants (e.g., usually services and 
resources).  Even much of altruistic behavior is egoistic (Andreoni, 1988; Olson, 1965).  
A donor may be generous but the act of giving may also produce some individual utility 
for the donor himself.  For example, charitable acts may be undertaken to earn personal 
prestige, rectitude, friendship, or social acclaim.  Coleman (1990) also said that 
individuals act purposively toward a goal shaped by values or preferences, so the simplest 
form of rational choice is that an action is taken only when the net benefits outweigh the 
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net costs.  So the question is which predictor better explains partners’ contributions to 
collective mitigation action.  This subsection briefly discusses individual decisions 
related to participating in collective hazard mitigation.  
According to rational choice theorists, individual decision making for taking 
preventive actions can be defined as the process of weighing benefits and risks.  
Individual decisions may consist of four cells (see Table 2-6).  Each cell represents a 
payoff following a player A’s choice.  Rows represent the player A’s two choices: taking 
preventive action or inaction.  Columns represent the probability of disaster: the 
probability of a disaster strike (α%) and the probability of no strike ((1-α)%).  R, S, P, 
and T respectively refer to reward, sucker, punishment, and temptation just like the 
prisoner’s dilemma game.  Rational individuals are assumed to choose a course of action 
based on their preferences of payoffs: for example, player A may prefer taking 
preventive action if he perceives high risk.  If player A takes preventive action and a 
disaster strikes, then he may enjoy the hazard adjustment benefits of minimum or no 
disaster loss (R); that is to say, hazard adjustment benefits are higher than its costs.  In 
contrast, if player A takes inaction and a disaster strikes, then his damage will be 
maximized (P); that is to say, he may suffer from a great disaster loss.  But if a disaster 
does not strike long after he takes preventive actions, player A may feel spending money 
for nothing (S); that is to say, hazard adjustment costs become greater than their benefits; 
for example, if he spends money on flood insurance based on the given flood 
information for decades but nothing happens after all.  He may see no benefits from 
purchasing flood insurance because extreme natural events are rare.  Moreover, private 
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homeowners’ insurance often fails to fully cover flood loss.  He has to purchase flood 
insurance separately through National Flood Insurance Program, which may not cover 
earthquake damage.  Player A may just save his hazard adjustment costs if he takes risks 
of inaction and disasters do not occur (T): that is to say, no actions, no costs, no losses, 
and no benefits.  Thus, hazard adjustments reward player A only when disaster occurs, 
meanwhile natural events with low probability but high hazard consequences punish 
player A when he takes inaction.   
 
Figure 2-6. Individual decision making for taking preventive action 
Disaster  
Strike (α%) No Strike ((1-α)%) 
Action R S A 
Inaction P T 
R: Reward; S: Sucker; P: Punishment; and T: Temptation 
 
Payoffs do not have ordinal significance because of the uncertainty of natural 
events and because of players’ risk taking behavior.  If the probability of disaster is high 
and he perceives more risks, the player A may prefer R to P (R > P) because punishment 
is the last payoff he wants and he more likely will take preventive action.  If the 
probability of disaster is low and he perceives low risk, in contrast, player A may prefer 
T to S (T > S) because he may think hazard adjustments are not worthy making and 
because he doesn’t want to spend money on the uncertain things in the future.  He will 
more likely take inaction when he strongly believes there will be no future events.  
However, even though disaster did not occur during past decades, it does not necessarily 
mean it will not occur in the future (e.g., Gamblers’ fallacy or Oldest Indian Syndrome).  
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In addition, players usually have insufficient information (e.g., about outcomes and 
benefits following their decisions) and lack ability (e.g., planning and calculation for 
probabilistic reasoning) to compare the net benefits with the net costs.  These personal 
contextual factors influence their risk taking behavior and make their decisions 
inconsistent and variable, thus irrational.  Moreover, the characteristics of hazard 
mitigation measures (e.g., in terms of effectiveness, duration, utility, affordability, and 
manageability) also influence players’ decisions to take preventive action (Berke, 1998).       
 
b. Problems of Collective Mitigation Action 
All group goals and interests are subject to collective action problems, which 
arise in the context of interaction within whole groups of individuals (Olson, 1965).  
Collective mitigation action is also subject to such collective action problems (e.g., 
public apathy and indifference to preventive action for hazard reduction).  In collective 
mitigation action, individuals and organizations may become partners and volunteer for 
mitigation projects to build a safer community rather than protect their own businesses 
or properties.  So they may voluntarily participate in collective action under the common 
mitigation interests of building a disaster resilient community or a sustainable 
community.  Four cells in Table 2-7 show payoffs following a community’s choice: 
reward, sucker, punishment, and temptation respectively.  Similar to individual decision 
making, rows represent a community’s two choices (for example, taking collective 
preventive action or inaction), and columns represent the probability of disaster striking 
a community.  However, the program effectiveness or collective benefits of community-
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based hazard mitigation programs can only be measured by low-probable, high-
consequence events (Wilson, 1989).  Moreover, collective hazard adjustments may 
reward not only contributors but all community members if mitigation measures are 
successfully implemented and disaster strikes.  In contrast, individual rational behavior 
of defection leads to collectively worse outcomes.  Collective inaction may result in 
punishment of all community members when disasters strike, not only defectors.  
Community members may experience severe social disruption due to the breakdown of 
all social services and lifelines, experience the degradation of environmental qualities 
such as water pollution when flooded, and experience an overall degraded quality of life 
(Mileti, 1999).  Highly vulnerable social and economic sectors may more likely suffer 
from direct family, business, or property losses.   
 
Figure 2-7  Individual decision making for collective preventive action 
Disaster Community 
Strike (α%) No Strike ((1-α)%) 
Action R S Collectively 
Inaction P T 
R: Reward; S: Sucker; P: Punishment; and T: Temptation 
 
In addition to the uncertainty of natural events, collective interests (e.g., in terms 
of the probabilities of program success, the perception of collective benefits, and the 
beliefs in individual contributions to changes) may have a strong influence on 
individuals’ decisions to make substantial contributions to community-based hazard 
mitigation.  The number of volunteers may influence individuals’ decision making for 
collective mitigation action just as in the n-person prisoner’s dilemma because of the 
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ratio of P / n, where P equals products and n equals number of volunteers.  The growing 
number of volunteers means relatively less effort per person for the production of goods.  
If that number is high, then the amount of individual effort can be ignored, individuals 
may prefer free riding.  Meanwhile, volunteers who join collective mitigation action at 
the early stage usually have to take the leading roles and contribute much more time, 
resources, and effort to implement the community-based hazard mitigation program than 
those who join later.  Their participation costs may well exceed paybacks.  So rational 
self-interested individuals may be better off with a free ride and enjoy collective benefits 
of community-based hazard mitigation from others’ contributions.  According to 
Heckathorn (1989), however, there always is a critical mass of people who are highly 
motivated because of their stake in the collective good.  This relation may not be 
automatic, but those who have more at stake are more likely to choose to act as 
promoters and strong supporters of the specific set of collective action and willing to pay 
the high initial costs for collective mitigation action.  In contrast, Klandermans (1984) 
argued that the present number of participants influence individuals’ decision to join 
because the size of the group may be perceived as the indicator of program success.  
According to him, if the probability of program success is perceived high or if more 
chances of its influence are perceived, individuals are more likely to join.  Thus, the 
question is whether the more serious they perceive problems to be and the more they are 
concerned, the more likely partners will make contributions.   
In addition, Roger and Whetten (1982) also discussed altruistic models to explain 
why organizations formulate relationships with others: altruistic forces can explain 
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organizational exchange which cannot be explained by motives of organizational 
survival or administrative self-aggrandizement.  In most cases, organizations are looking 
for resources and they formulate alliances with other organizations to secure resources or 
avoid duplication in performing given tasks.  They join or maintain partnerships with 
other organizations to obtain common goals unless their autonomy is threatened by the 
interrelationship.  Gillespie and his colleague (1993) also confirmed this aspect of 
interorganizational relations for preparedness.   
Barnard (1938) defined organizations as “cooperative systems that function to 
achieve collective as well as individual goals.”  Organizational interactions occur among 
groups because of their agreement on altruistic goals and collective interests as well as 
their individual goals and interests (Dillman, 1970).  Thus, those who are highly 
motivated by collective interests are more likely to make contributions to collective 
mitigation action.  
 
2.5  Summary 
In summary, self-interest and social norms have been widely recognized and well 
documented by economists and social scientists as the two determinants guiding 
behaviors.  For example, Elster (1989) discussed man as a creature who is conditional 
and future outcome-oriented (e.g., if you want to achieve Y, then do X) and also sticks to 
prescribed behaviors (e.g., if others do Y, then do X or do X if and only if it would be 
good for all).  Here, the former represents Hobbesian perspective viewing man as a 
calculator who is rational and self-interested, always trying to maximize his returns (e.g., 
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in Wilson’s terms material gain, personal safety, and social reputation).  Meanwhile, the 
latter represents Durkheimian perspectives which try to understand human nature in a 
social context where social interactions are essentially normative.  People stick to most 
social values whether those values are good or bad and conform to the rules which are 
usually enforced by norm beneficiaries (e.g., rules of politeness or rules of fairness).  
These two distinctive lines of thought, self-interest and social norms, will guide this 
study of collective action for community-based hazard mitigation.  The first assumption 
is that Tulsa Project Impact partners will be very concerned about participation costs 
because most mitigation projects are extra jobs for them (H3).  Their contributions are 
also expected to vary depending on their perception of selective benefits (H2).  
Meanwhile, disaster resilient or sustainable community has become a new concept to 
deal with disasters and accepted as a new social value for local communities to pursue.  
For example, a growing number of people may agree that taking preventive actions will 
save money in the long run.  Their collective interests are assumed to somehow guide 
their behavior to join and volunteer for collective mitigation action to build a safer 
community (H1).  A new social value may also lead partners to set rules to guide 
behavior.  Partners’ contributions are expected to vary depending on their beliefs in 
other partners’ contributions to collective action (H4).  Finally, internalized norms of 
participation will be tested for this study.  People who feel obliged to participate in 
community-based hazard mitigation activities are assumed more likely to contribute to 
collective mitigation action (H5).     
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CHAPTER III 
HYPOTHESES 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 This chapter describes theories and models applied to this research, and also 
develops research hypotheses that were derived from the literature review.  More 
specifically, the first part of the chapter discusses a rational choice model.  The second 
part states research rationales followed by five hypotheses.  The last part introduces a 
conceptual model that identifies partners’ attitudes influencing their contributions.   
 
3.2 Rationale for Hypotheses 
 Many collective action scholars use individual decision models to debate 
collective action problems and predict the likely outcomes of collective action at the 
individual level (Oliver, 1993; Zey, 1998).  They provide decision equations for the net 
payoffs of participating in the various forms of collective action as a function of the 
benefit of the collective good, the benefit of selective incentives, and the costs of 
participation (Finkel, Muller, and Opp, 1989; Finkel and Muller, 1998; Oliver, 1980; 
Oliver, Marwell, and Teixeira, 1985; Riker and Ordeshook, 1968).  These decision 
equations are usually used to identify and discuss the determinants of participation: for 
example, self-interest, consideration toward others, fairness, fear of becoming a sucker, 
and desire to make a difference (Oliver, 1993).    
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This study will utilize individual decision models to explore the mechanisms of 
collective action for community-based hazard mitigation and develop a statistical model 
to determine factors influencing a partner’s decision to make a contribution.  All partners 
are assumed to continually face individual decisions to make or not to make sustained 
contributions to community-based hazard mitigation because they are continually 
informed about events and encouraged by the program coordinators to voluntarily 
participate in new mitigation projects.  Individual institutions, that is, the partners, will 
be treated as the decision makers, as individual agents, because organizations are also 
individual in the sense of having one decision to make (Elster, 1989).  Rational choice 
theorists including Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Elster (1985, 1989), and Coleman 
(1990) tend to view collective action as “no more than aggregate individual action” 
(Zey, 1998, p. 17), and regard social entities such as groups or organizations as 
individuals.  Zey (1998) again discussed it as “…the mechanisms through which rational 
choice explanations operate are the preferences and beliefs of individuals, rational 
choice explanation cannot be predicated upon anything other than individual 
preferences” (p. 17).  Rational choice theorists argue that social entities do not have 
preference orders, but individuals do (Ibid.).   
 
3.2.1 Rational Choice for Collective Action 
Motivation to participate in collective action is defined as a function of the 
subjective expectation or perceived likelihood that such collective action will yield 
outcomes and the subjective values of those outcomes (Klandermans, 1984, 1992; 
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Mitchell, 1974).   This value-expectancy product is consistent with rational choice 
theory.   According to this value-expectancy theory, the higher the expectation of 
collective benefits and the more a partner values the collective benefits (e.g. 
attractiveness of collective goods), the more likely the individual is to participate in 
Project Impact.  This study will adapt the collective interest model developed by Finkel, 
Muller, and Opp (1989), to explain the rational choice mechanisms of collective action 
in Project Impact and discuss the determinants of contribution.  Partners are expected to 
participate in Project Impact to the extent that (1) they have high levels of discontent 
with the current levels of community vulnerability to natural and technological hazards, 
(2) they believe that collective mitigation efforts can be successful in building 
community safety; and (3) they believe that their own contribution will enhance the 
likelihood of the collective mitigation effort's success (Klandermans, 1984).  
The expected value of participation can be calculated by: 
 
EV = [(pg + pi)*V] – C + B 
 
Where EV: the expected value of participation in Project Impact,  
pg: the probability that the program will be successful,  
pi: the marginal influence of the individual’s contribution on the 
probability of success,  
V: the value of the collective good,  
C: the selective cost of participation,  
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and B: the selective benefit available from participation.   
 
a. Collective Interests 
In their model, Finkel, Muller, and Opp (1989) defined the collective interest 
with the terms in brackets, [(pg + pi)*V].  First, the estimated value of participation in 
Project Impact is an increasing function of a partner’s valuation (V in an equation above) 
of the collective benefits of successful action (Lubell, 2002).  The primary collective 
benefits of PI are community safety and quality of life (Geis, 2000; Krimm, 1998).  Risk 
perception or safety concern is the major factor facilitating collective action (e.g., 
opposing the siting of hazardous waste facilities) (Hamilton, 1992).  Thus, a partner’s 
contribution to Project Impact will vary with perception of the severity of community 
vulnerabilities to hazards and the long-term economic benefits of Project Impact.  
Secondly, a partner’s contribution is also assumed to vary with perception of personal 
efficacy (pi in the equation above): perception of the personal influence on producing 
program outcomes (Klandermans, 1984; Nagel, 1987).  A partner who perceives 
individual contribution as making no difference in producing collective goods is less 
likely to contribute.  Thirdly, a partner’s contributions will vary with perception of group 
efficacy (pg in an equation above) and perception of other partners’ contributions 
(Klandermans, 1984; Nagel, 1987; Oberschall, 1980).  Klandermans (1984) argued that a 
partner’s perception of the number of partners and their contributions influences belief in 
the program success.  In addition, a partner’s contribution is expected to vary with 
beliefs about the effectiveness of hazard mitigation for reducing community 
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vulnerabilities (called “program effectiveness”, pp in this study).  Thus, the collective 
interest in PI can be defined as [(pg + pi + pp)*V].  The first hypothesis to test is: 
• H1: Partners’ contributions will increase when the estimated value of collective 
interest increases. 
 
b. Selective Benefits 
Olson (1965) proposed selective incentives to solve the collective action 
problem, especially in large groups.  He said “the incentive must be ‘selective’ so that 
those who do not join the organization working for the group’s interests, or in other 
ways contribute to the attainment of the group’s interest, can be treated differently from 
those who do (Olson, 1965, pp. 51).”  Knoke (1988) also discussed private goods as 
selective incentives and their methods of production: for example, by allowing a 
collective to restrict the private benefits to persons.  Project Impact provides partners 
with material (e.g., resources), information (e.g., task redundancy), and social (e.g., 
recognition of rewards) incentives (B in an equation above).  A partner’s contribution is 
expected to vary with perception of such selective incentives.  At the interorganizational 
level, organizations often look for others with resources (Galaskiewicz, 1985), extend 
network linkages (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), and ally to increase control over scarce 
resources (Gulati, 1995; Mulford, 1984; Oliver, 1990).  Similarly, government agencies 
and non-profit community-based organizations tend to formulate preparedness and 
mitigation networks in order to secure resources and avoid redundancy in tasks 
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(Gillespie, Colignon, Banerjee, Murty, and Rogge, 1993).  Thus, the second hypothesis 
to test is: 
• H2:  Partners’ contributions will increase with their perception of selective 
benefits. 
 
c. Participation Costs 
 Time, money, and skills are necessary for intensive forms of participation 
(Nagel, 1987; Oliver, 1984).  In Project Impact, partners contribute their time to the 
program by serving on committees or subcommittees, attending regularly scheduled 
meetings, participating in mitigation projects, attending workshops or conferences for 
hazard reduction, and contacting other organizations’ staff.  Participation in these 
program activities is a burden to them because most of them have jobs and have to 
contribute extra time, money, and effort to collective mitigation action.  Thus, time in 
terms of frequency and amount of hours is the most critical cost indicator of 
participation.  Moreover, the cost of time devoted to participating in these program 
activities reduces the opportunities for a partner to contribute to economic production or 
other activities.  In addition, knowledge and skills are also required for a partner to 
participate in the planning and implementation of mitigation measures (Wachtendorf, 
2001).  Thus, partners with resources and previous experience in emergency 
management are more likely to join Project Impact than marginally profitable partners.  
The hypothesis to test is:      
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• H3: Partners’ contributions will decrease as their perceived participation costs 
increase. 
 
3.2.2 Social Norms as Predictors of Contribution   
 In addition to rational choice, normative conformity is an important motivation 
independently affecting individual’s involvement in collective action (Knoke, 1988).  
This section will briefly discuss social norms as predictors of contribution.   
 
a. Norms of Cooperation 
Game theorists or rational choice theorists argue that rational self-interested 
individuals comply with or innovate norms based on their cost-benefit calculation of 
actions for solving problems (Horne, 2001).  For example, natural disasters raise public 
awareness about the norms of safety (e.g., a drought might give rise to norms supporting 
conservation of water) and prompt governments to establish comprehensive regulatory 
systems to guide behaviors.  Such an exogenous shock creates new social, economic, 
and environmental conditions leading to changes in cost-benefit conditions which can 
spur a group of stakeholders to change informal rules and social practices (Ellickson, 
2001).   
For game theorists, norms are patterns of action which emerge when people 
frequently and consistently behave in a certain manner.  They view cooperative behavior 
as equivalent to a norm, which guides rational self-interested individuals to behave pro-
socially (Horne, 2001).  For example, Olson’s argument was analyzed with the 
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prisoners’ dilemma game in which defection is the dominant strategy for both players.  
Hardin also discussed free riding issues in the n-person prisoners’ dilemma in which 
defection is still the best strategy for players.  However, repetition of a game changes 
patterns of action.  According to game theorists, rational self-interested players are better 
off defecting at the first stage of the game with only two options of cooperation and 
defection, but at the second stage they can react to the first decisions with sanctioning 
and punishment (Voss, 2001).  Sanctions are usually created and enforced by norm 
beneficiaries.  These beneficiaries institutionalize cooperation to enforce norms when 
they realize the catastrophic consequences of defective action as in the n-person 
prisoners’ dilemma game (e.g., herdsmen’s tragedy in sharing a pasture).  Similarly, 
perception of the consequences of inaction leads partners to cooperate rather than defect 
and contributes to collective action for community-based hazard mitigation.  Thus, 
players discount their future payoffs.  If a discount factor is large enough, then 
cooperation is enforced.  In Project Impact, partners are expected to choose strategic 
cooperation such as conditional cooperation (e.g., I will contribute as long as other 
partners do) instead of full cooperation (e.g., otherwise organizations would lose 
autonomy).  Thus, norms of cooperation will be measured.  The hypothesis to test is:   
• H4: Partners’ contributions will increase with conformation to norms of 
cooperation.           
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b. Internalized Norms of Participation 
For some, norms are not simply rules.  For some scholars such as Cooter (1998) 
and Elster (1989), norms should be internalized.  They believe that the factor which 
induces compliance with norms lies within an individual person.  Social norms are 
usually initiated, shared, enforced, and sustained by other people’s approval and 
disapproval of behaviors (Elster, 1985, 1989).  They again influence a person’s values 
and norms so as to guide behaviors.  Here, values are the most fundamental elements of 
social norms.  Some norms which are deeply held create part of a person’s self-image 
and guide behavior in expected ways (Elster, 1985), therefore social preferences become 
a part of their self-interest (e.g., an internal obligation).  In this way, social norms 
become individual norms which generate moral attitudes.  When violating social norms, 
people feel embarrassment and shame: violation of moral norms generates guilt (Elster, 
1985, 1989).  Individuals who feel compelled to obey norms would pay a net price to 
uphold an internal obligation (e.g., protecting lives and properties from catastrophic 
natural events), but individual norms do not necessarily lead them to action.  For 
example, consumers believe that buying environment-friendly products benefits all 
social members, but all of them do not buy such products; and many drivers believe that 
carpooling is desirable for the reduction of air pollution, but all of them do not carpool.  
Schwartz (1992) identified two preconditions to generate action: awareness of the 
consequences and ascription of responsibility.  He argued that internalized norms lead to 
action when these conditions are satisfied (see Figure 3-1).  In Project Impact, partners 
are expected to contribute when they feel an internal obligation to do so to improve 
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community safety and quality of life.  Thus, internalized behavioral norms will be 
measured.  The final hypothesis to test is: 
• H5: Partners’ contributions will increase with their internalized norms of 
participation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social Norms:  
Norms of Cooperation 
Collective 
Action 
Awareness of  
the Consequences
 H5 
H1 
Self-Interests: 
Selective Costs & Benefits 
    H2, H3
H4
Collective 
Interests 
Internalized  
Norms 
Figure 3-1  Collective action generation mechanisms 
 
3.3 Statistical Model 
From the literature review, five explanatory variables are identified: collective 
interest, selective incentives, participation costs, norms of cooperation, and internalized 
norms of participation.  The statistical model developed to test these hypotheses is: 
 
Y = a + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + b5X5
 
Where  a: intercept 
Y: a partner’s contribution to PI 
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X1: collective interests ([(pg + pi + pp)*V]) 
X2: selective benefits  
X3: participation costs   
X4: norms of cooperation 
and X5: internalized norms of participation 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODS AND DATA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 This chapter consists of three parts.  The first part describes the study design 
including study procedure, community selection, and study area.  The second part 
describes the research methods including survey methods and statistical analyses.  The 
third part describes study variables and measurements including contribution, collective 
interests, selective benefits, internalized norms of participation, norms of cooperation, 
and participation costs.     
 
4.2 Study Design 
4.2.1 Study Procedure 
This research is a one-shot case study.  Project Impact communities were 
carefully reviewed on the basis of their goals, hazard types, preferences of mitigation 
measures, resource mobilization, and implementation procedures, etc.  The best example 
of a Project Impact community for applying the collective interest model was selected on 
the basis of these criteria.  A mail survey was sent to all partners who joined Tulsa 
Project Impact, which was selected as the best Project Impact community.  Mail survey 
data on respondents’ contributions, collective interests, perception of selective benefits, 
internalized norms of participation, norms of cooperation, and perception of 
participation costs were all collected within a conceptual boundary of a community at 
59
  
one time.  The five hypotheses were tested using correlation analyses and hierarchical 
regression analyses.   
 
4.2.2 Community Selection 
 The most generalizable results would be obtained by collecting data from a 
random sample of communities that had adequate variation in community size, local 
capacity to implement mitigation measures (Burby, May, and Paterson, 1998), local 
mitigation planning practices (Berke, 1998), and complexity of networks.  Other 
desirable characteristics of such a sample would include the development level of 
professional communities (Birkland, 1997), type and role of organizations in mitigation 
systems (Alesch and Petak, 2001), hazard adjustments taken for specific hazard types 
(Gillespie, Colignon, Banerjee, Murty, and Rogge, 1993), and levels of exposure to 
hazards (Lindell, Alesch, Bolton, Greene, Larson, Lopes, May, Mulilis, Nathe, Nigg, 
Palm, Pate, Pine, Tubbesing, and Whitney, 1997).  Lacking the ability to conduct such a 
random sample, careful selection of a test community can provide a reasonable basis for 
testing the proposed theory.  Criteria for selecting such a community will be the presence 
of a successful Project Impact program, number of partners, profile of partners, hazard 
types, mitigation measures, and data availability.  
Tulsa Project Impact meets these criteria because it won the 1998 FEMA Project 
Impact Model Community Award, 1999 FEMA Region VI Star Community Award, 
2000 Housing and Urban Development “Simply the Best” Award for best practices, 
2000 Project Impact Mentoring Community Award, and 2002 FEMA Mentoring 
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Community for its work with community and faith-based organizations.  Moreover, 
Tulsa Project Impact is recognized as having conscientiously followed FEMA guidelines 
to build a disaster resistant community and satisfied FEMA’s intention to help local 
communities manage their own programs for hazard reduction.  Tulsa Project Impact has 
the permanent funding sources to support program activities.  Additionally, Tulsa Project 
Impact intended to recruit eventually 500 partners and successfully recruited 385 
partners from various social sectors by November 2002 (Tulsa Project Impact, 2002).  It 
has been very successful compared with other communities.  Tulsa Project Impact had 
also dealt with about ten multi-hazards and implemented 14 mitigation and preparedness 
projects by March 2002.  Additionally, addresses, phone numbers, and e-mail addresses 
of partners are available at Tulsa Project Impact.   
 
4.2.3 Study Area 
 Tulsa, OK has a strong hazard management history as well as a long flood 
disaster loss history (e.g., the 1984 Memorial Day Flooding cost Tulsa 14 deaths, 288 
injuries, 7,000 properties damaged or destroyed, and $180 million - $257 million in 1994 
dollars).  There are four symbolic paradigms: the structural era, regulatory era, non-
structural era, and watershed era.  The newest era which Tulsa community has recently 
pursued is characterized by its comprehensive approach to disaster problem solving.  It 
posits fundamental problem solving approaches above and beyond a specific disaster 
type or a specific context of hazard.  It proposes longer and broader scopes of hazard 
adjustments for dealing with the basic problems of disaster-human causation.  The Tulsa 
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community believes that this new direction is a comprehensive, regional approach to 
develop long-term solutions based on collaborative partnerships which mirror the best of 
Tulsa's local goals and priorities.  
 
4.2.4 Study Population and Unit of Analysis 
The target population for this study is composed of the partners who joined Tulsa 
Project Impact.  The unit of analysis used to test the hypotheses is “individuals as a 
decision maker”. 
 
4.3 Research Methods 
4.3.1 Survey Methods  
 Non-probabilistic sampling was used for this case study because the size of 
group was too small to use random sampling.  In addition, it was impossible to sort out 
participation levels and organizational types lacking information about partners and their 
cooperation.  Because of the nature of the available data, all 385 partners who joined 
Tulsa Project Impact were all included in this survey research.      
Due to the involvement of human subjects, this mail survey received approval 
from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) which specified that information about the 
research must be explained to the respondents before the survey began. The mailing for 
those who did not have an e-mail account contained a cover letter (see Appendix 1), a 
self-administrated questionnaire (see Appendix 2), and a pre-stamped return envelop.  
The initial mailing for those with e-mail accounts contained only a cover letter listing the 
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website and encouraging them to participate in an online survey.  The cover letter was 
also sent by e-mail, so the online questionnaire was linked and opened with a click.  
However, the online questionnaire generated critical problems.  Some elderly 
respondents had difficulty following the instructions.  Some of them could not open a 
questionnaire online or submit answers.  Moreover, some answers seemed to lack 
validity because they did not make sense.  For example, one respondent said that she 
represents a big organization (employees = 4,000) and made more than $100,000 last 
year, but her final education attainment was listed less than high school.   
The letter was sent to inform participants that the online questionnaire would be 
shut down and hard-copy questionnaires would be sent.  The mailing packet was mailed 
out to all 385 subjects who were named in the list of Tulsa Project Impact partners by 
November 2003.  The packet was sent twice - December 2 and 15.  Only 96 subjects 
responded, so the gross response rate was slightly over 25% - typically defined as the 
ratio of mail returns to the mail-out universe.  Unfortunately, 65 subjects (about 17 
percent) were unreachable either by both mail or e-mail because they had moved out of 
Tulsa or resettled elsewhere.  Thus, the adjusted response rate was about 30%.  
However, the term “response rate” has a specific meaning to many authors with many 
definitions.  For this study, the concept of “completion rate” was used for diagnostic 
purposes.  For example, four out of 96 respondents replied with few answers.  One 
respondent answered twice because he had two different addresses on the list and 
received the same questionnaire twice by accident.  The term “completion rate” can be 
defined as the extent to which a task has been accomplished.  According to this 
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definition, the completion rate for this study can be defined as the ratio of the number of 
subjects who completed the questionnaire form (N=91) to the number of subjects who 
received a questionnaire (N=319).  The completion rate was slightly over 28.5%.  
However, two respondents were hired and working for the Tulsa Project Impact program 
as full-time employees.  Both responded to the survey, but should not be included for 
this study because they could bias the results.  Thus, the final number of cases available 
for this study was 89.  
 
4.3.2 Statistical Analysis 
Statistical analyses employed include scale reliability tests, correlation tests, 
independent-samples t tests, one-way ANOVA tests, and hierarchical regression 
analyses. Correlation tests were implemented to empirically test the relationships of 
respondents’ contribution to the program activities with their collective interests, 
perception of selective incentives, internalized norms of participation, norms of 
cooperation, and perception of participation costs.  Correlation tests were also 
implemented to empirically test the relationship of respondents’ contributions to 
program activities with their demographic characteristics, as well as the relationship of 
respondents’ demographic characteristics with their contributions and attitudes. 
Independent-samples t tests were performed to determine whether there were 
contribution or attitudinal differences among subgroups.  One-way ANOVA tests were 
also implemented to examine whether there would be any difference in means among 
characteristic groups (such as age, income, and education). Lastly, hierarchical 
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regression analyses were used to test the collective interest model for explaining 
partners’ contribution and identifying the best predictors of partners’ contribution to 
collective action for community-based hazard mitigation. 
 
4.4 Variables and Measurement 
4.4.1 Demographic Characteristics 
The mail survey data included social, economic, and demographic features (see 
Appendix for the survey instrument). The questionnaire included age, gender, ethnic 
identity, educational achievement, income level, and years in the Tulsa community. All 
variables except age and years in Tulsa community were measured as categorical 
variables.  Ethnic identity was measured as five categorical variables, African American, 
Caucasian, Hispanic or Latino, Asian or Pacific Islander, and Others. Educational 
attainment was also measured as five categorical variables, “Less than high school”, 
“High school or GED”, “Some college or vocational school”, “College graduate”, and 
“Graduate or professional school”. Personal income was measured by “Less than 
$14,000”, “$14,000-$24,999”, “$25,000-$34,999”, “$35,000-$44,999”, “$45,000-
$54,999”, “$55,000-$64,999”, “$64,000-$99,999”, and “over $100,000”.  
 
4.4.2 Contributions 
 Contribution is a fuzzy concept, which cannot be clearly defined in a single 
word.  Its meaning varies depending on situations and conditions.  Scholars such as 
Tornblom and Johnson (1985) attempted to find universal principles of match-ups 
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between a person’s outcomes and his inputs in terms of ability, efforts, and productivity: 
for example, “how well outcomes match inputs of (a) effort extended, (b) ability, innate 
or achieved, or (c) productivity, the actual results accomplished” (p. 249).  However, 
contribution may simply mean a person’s inputs (e.g., amount of money donated), so it 
occurs when inputs outweigh paybacks.  The dictionary refers to contribution as any 
meaning of share (e.g., any one of a number of individual efforts in a common endeavor) 
or donation (e.g., as of money, service, or ideas).  For example, it could mean an act of 
giving in common with others for a common purpose, especially to a charity.   
For this study, contribution may be defined as a function of activities, time, and 
efforts.  Thus, partners’ contribution can be measured with four variables: time invested 
for program activities, number of projects in which partners participated, number of 
subcommittees on which partners served, and their evaluation of personal contribution.  
Time investment was measured with an average of hours per month spent on four 
program activities.  Five items were used to measure a partner’s evaluation of personal 
contribution: donating money, sharing information, providing knowledge or skills, 
offering materials, and loaning equipment (see Table 4-1).  They were measured on a 
five scale where “No contribution” equals 1, “Median contribution” equals 3, and 
“Major contribution” equals 5 (see Appendix 2). 
 
4.4.3 Collective Interests 
 A partner’ collective interest in community-based hazard mitigation was the 
average of an individual’s score on five measures of risk perception, perceived level of 
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community vulnerability, economic benefits, program effectiveness, and individual 
contribution (see Table 4-1).  Respondents were asked to indicate their concern about 
each issue (0-5 scale).  The higher number represents higher levels of overall interest in 
community-based hazard mitigation.  
The questionnaire asked respondents to rate their level of concern about the 
likelihood of three types of consequences: property loss, injury, and business loss to 
respondents, family members or neighbors for given types of hazards (flood, winter 
storm, and tornado) within the next ten years.  Each item was measured with a five scale 
in which “Not at all likely” equals 1 and “Almost a certainty” equals 5.  Respondents 
were asked to rate their perception of community vulnerabilities.  Vulnerability can be 
measured by two variables: respondents’ belief in the level of community’s exposure to 
hazards and the level of capacity to cushion hazard impacts.  To measure them, nine 
items were identified: four items addressed respondents’ belief in the level of exposure 
in terms of people, property, utility, and transportation at risk; three items addressed 
respondents’ belief in the individual levels (residential, business, and structure) of hazard 
adjustments; and two items for respondents’ belief in the level of community’s resources 
to deal with hazards.  Nine items were measured with a five scale in which “Strongly 
disbelieve” equals 1 and “Strongly believe” equals 5. 
Three items were asked to measure economic benefits which community-based 
hazard mitigation brings into the community ranging from economic benefits to 
individuals to benefits to business.  They were measured with a five scale in which 
“Strongly disagree” equals 1 and “Strongly agree” equals 5.  The questionnaire included 
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a list of program activities of Project Impact: program effectiveness on identifying local 
mitigation needs, providing a variety of hazard mitigation activities, coordinating 
mitigation efforts, prioritizing mitigation projects, and mobilizing resources.  These five 
categories of program activities were also rated by respondents with a five scale in 
which “Strongly disbelieve” equals 1 and “Strongly believe” equals 5.  Finally, 
respondents rated the perceived probability that individual contributions can bring about 
change.  Four items were used: two items (in terms of group effectiveness) to measure 
group efficacy and two items (in terms of single contribution and individual influences) 
for individual efficacy.  A five scale in which “Strongly disagree” equals 1 and 
“Strongly agree” equals 5, was used as well.     
   
4.4.4  Selective Benefits 
 The questionnaire asked respondents to rate three types of selective incentives: 
social, information, and material incentives (see Table 4-1).  First, selective incentives 
were measured with three items of reward opportunity: social respect from family 
members and neighbors and an award opportunity for performance.  Second, information 
incentives were also measured with three items: hazard information, hazard adjustment 
information, and information about other partners’ roles and mission.  Finally, material 
incentives were measured with three items of opportunity to exchange resources, get 
financial assistance, and receive technical assistance.  All nine items were measured with 
a five scale in which “Not at all” equals 1 and “Very great extent” equals 5.   
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4.4.5 Internalized Norms of Participation 
The questionnaire asked respondents to rate how much they felt obliged to take 
preventive action.  Five items used to measure were: feeling of obligation to protect 
family members, participation in decisions to build a safer community, participation in 
projects to build a safer community, volunteering to help people and businesses at risk, 
and participation in projects because it is their job to protect people and property (see 
Table 4-1).  They were all measured with a five scale in which “Strongly disagree” 
equals 1 and “Strongly agree” equals 5.   
 
4.4.6 Norms of Cooperation 
 Respondents were also asked to rate to what extent they believe other partners 
should make contributions to the following five items: their contributions are good for 
all; their contributions help people and business at risk; their contributions share social 
responsibility; their contributions share common mitigation goals; and their time and 
resource contribution (see Table 4-1).  They were all measured with a five scale in which 
“Strongly disbelieve” equals 1 and “Strongly believe” equals 5.   
 
4.4.7 Participation Costs 
The questionnaire asked respondents to rate participation cost as well.  In the 
collective action literature, time was identified as the best indicator of participation cost 
(Oliver, 1984).  Participation cost was measured with time (e.g., in terms of frequency 
and length of meetings, number of projects, and distance to meeting places), money, and 
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task unfamiliarity (see Table 4-1).  These were all measured with a five scale in which 
“Strongly disagree” equals 1 and “Strongly agree” equals 5.   
 
Table 4- 1  Measurement of variables 
Variables Measurement 
Collective Interests 
Risk Perception 
Potential Loss of Property 
Potential Injury 
Potential Loss of Business 
Level of Exposure 
Perceived Level of Risk (People at Risk) 
Perceived Level of Risk (Property at Risk) 
Perceived Level of Utility Facilities (Critical Facilities at Risk) 
Perceived Level of Transportation Facilities (Critical Facilities at Risk)  
Hazard Adjustment 
Level 
Belief in Residential Hazard Adjustments 
Belief in Business Hazard Adjustments 
Belief in Community Hazard Adjustments 
Community 
Vulnerabilities 
Community Capacity Perceived Problem in Internal Resource Capacity 
Perceived Problem in Access to Outer Sources  
Economic Benefits 
Perceived Benefits to Individuals 
Perceived Benefits to Businesses 
Perceived Benefits to Community   
Program Effectiveness 
Identifying Local Mitigation Needs 
Providing Program Diversity 
Coordinating Local Hazard Adjustment Projects 
Prioritizing Hazard Mitigation Projects  
Mobilizing Local Resources  
Group/ Individual Efficacy 
Belief in Effectiveness of Group Works  
Belief in Effectiveness of Group Works 
Belief in Every Single Contribution 
Belief in Personal Influence on Bringing about Changes 
Selective Benefits 
Social Incentives 
Award Opportunities 
Social Respect (Neighbors) 
Social Respect (Family Members) 
Information Incentive 
Information about Other Partners’ Mission and Tasks 
Information about Hazards  
Information about Hazard Adjustments  
Material Incentives Financial assistance (ratio) Technical assistance (ratio) 
Participation Costs 
Time 
Frequency of Meetings  
Length of Meetings 
Distance to Meeting Places 
Number of Projects 
Money Direct Money Loss 
Knowledge or Skills Familiarity with Tasks  
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Table 4- 1  (continued) 
Variables Measurement 
Norms of Cooperation 
Norms of Cooperation 
Doing Good Things for All 
Helping People and Businesses at Risk 
Fairness in Sharing Responsibilities 
Fairness in Sharing Common Mitigation Goals 
Fairness in Contributing Time and Resources 
Individualized Norms of Participation 
Internal Obligation 
Protecting Family Members and Relatives 
Participating in Decision Making Processes  
Building Community Safer 
Helping People and Business at Risk 
Doing Jobs 
Contribution 
Time Investment 
Attending Meetings 
Serving on Task Forces 
Attending Events (e.g., Conferences or Lecture) 
Attending Programs (e.g., Education or Training)  
Individual Contribution 
Donating Money 
Sharing Information 
Providing Knowledge 
Offering Materials 
Loaning Equipment  
Number of Projects Program Activities Number of Subcommittees 
Organizational Contribution 
Personnel 
Money 
Material 
Equipment 
Facility 
Confounding Variables 
Gender Male/ Female  
Age Age  
Race Ethnic Groups  
Education Final Educational Attainment 
Income Annual Income  
Respondent’s 
Characteristics 
Years Years Living in Tulsa Community  
Type Organization’s Original Mission  
Size Number of Fulltime Employees  
Organizational 
Attributes 
Membership Year Year  when Organization Joined the Program 
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CHAPTER V  
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 This chapter presents analyses testing five hypotheses to determine whether five 
collective action determinants of collective interests, selective incentives, internalized 
norms, norms of cooperation, and participation costs are related to partners’ 
contributions.  In the first part, the reliabilities of multi-item and individual scales were 
assessed.  The second part presents the descriptive characteristics of survey respondents.  
The third part discusses the correlations of respondents’ contributions with various 
predictors of collective action.  Hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to 
identify and examine which collective action best predicted partners’ contributions.   
 
5.2 Scale Reliabilities 
The multi-item measures of partners’ contributions were internally inconsistent 
(see Table 5-1).  Time investment items formed a scale of low reliability (4 items, α = 
.40), while individual contribution items formed a scale with high reliability (5 items, α 
= .83).  When they are all added together to form a composite scale, however, their 
reliability is relatively low (α = .46).  In addition, the questionnaire also measured two 
contribution variables with a single item: the number of mitigation projects, in which 
respondents participated, and the number of subcommittees on which they served.   
 
72
  
Table 5-1  Questionnaire contents 
 
Items 
Mean 
(M) 
 
Range 
Scale 
Reliability 
 
Items 
Mean 
(M) 
 
Range 
Scale 
Reliability 
 
Internalized Norms 
  Protecting family  
  Participating in decisions 
  Building community safer 
  Helping people/ business 
  Doing jobs 
 
 
 
4.28 
3.92 
3.92 
3.68 
3.47 
 
 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
 
.85 
Norms of Cooperation 
  Doing good things for all 
 Helping people/ business     
  Sharing responsibilities 
  Sharing mitigation goals 
  Contributing time/ efforts 
 
 
4.04 
4.04 
4.05 
3.96 
3.89 
 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
.93 
Participation Costs 
  Time (Frequency) 
  Time (Length) 
  Time (Distance) 
  Time (Project Number) 
  Cost 
  Familiarity with tasks 
 
 
2.74 
2.80 
2.65 
2.72 
1.98 
2.21 
 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
.71 
Organizational Profile 
  Membership year 
  Number of employees 
  Resource contribution 
      Personnel 
      Money 
      Material 
      Equipment 
      Facility 
 
 
4.65 
467.89
42 
.68 
.21 
.34 
.28 
.43 
 
1-7 
1-8000 
 
0-1 
0-1 
0-1 
0-1 
0-1 
-.050 
 
 
.69 
 
Collective Interests 
Risk Perception 
  Property loss                              
  Injury                                     
  Business loss 
Community Vulnerability 
  Level of exposure  
      People at risk 
      Building at risk 
      Utility facilities at risk 
      Transportation facilities 
  Hazard adjustment level     
      Residential 
      Business 
      Community 
  Community capacity 
      Internal resource capacity 
      Access to outer sources 
Economic Benefit 
  Benefits to individuals 
  Benefits to business 
  Benefits to community 
Program Effectiveness 
  Identifying local needs 
  Providing various activities 
  Coordinating projects 
  Prioritizing projects 
  Mobilizing resources     
Group/ Individual Efficacy 
  Group works 
  Every single contribution  
  Individual influence 
 
 
 
3.83 
3.08 
3.35 
 
 
3.88 
3.78 
3.54 
3.46 
 
3.23 
3.69 
3.69 
 
3.14 
2.78 
 
4.61 
4.22 
4.41 
 
4.28 
4.25 
4.25 
4.29 
4.22 
 
4.60 
4.28 
3.99 
 
 
 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
 
 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
 
1-5 
1-5 
 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
 
.88 
.86 
 
 
 
.81 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.78 
 
 
 
.97 
 
 
 
 
 
.82 
 
 
 
 
Selective Benefits 
Social Incentives 
  Award opportunity 
  Social respect (Neighbor) 
  Social respect (Family) 
Information Incentives 
  Partners’ mission & tasks 
  Hazard-related information 
  Hazard-adjustment info.  
Material Incentives 
  Resource exchange  
  Financial assistance 
  Technical assistance 
 
 
 
1.21 
1.62 
1.78 
 
3.11 
3.78 
3.72 
 
3.65 
1.71 
2.74 
 
 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
.81 
.68 
 
 
 
.86 
 
 
 
.65 
Contribution 
Time Investments 
  Attending meetings 
  Serving on take forces 
  Attending events 
  Attending programs 
Individual Contribution 
  Donating money 
  Sharing information 
  Providing knowledge 
  Offering materials 
  Loaning equipment 
Number of Projects 
Number of task forces 
 
 
 
2.04 
2.94 
1.05 
  .62 
 
1.48 
2.82 
2.63 
1.75 
1.47 
2.57 
  .97 
 
 
 
0-40 
0-160 
0-16 
0-8 
 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
1-12 
1-12 
.46 
.40 
 
 
 
 
.83 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis of collective interest scales indicated adequate levels of reliability: risk 
perception (3 items, α = .86), community vulnerabilities (9 items, α = .81), economic 
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benefits (3 items, α = .78), program effectiveness (5 items, α = .97), and group/ 
individual efficacy (3 items, α = .82).  Originally, two items were measured to determine 
group efficacy and two items for individual efficacy.  The effectiveness of group 
efficacy was measured with two items with the same meaning.  Respondents were given 
two different questions to rate their agreement on: “The activity of a single person 
cannot reduce community vulnerabilities to hazards” and “Working together is more 
effective than individually working for hazard reduction.”  But the first item was 
inconsistent with the other item, and their reliability level was unrealistic (α = -.15).  
Measurement error was assumed.  Respondents were assumed to rate it in reversed 
order, so all the scores of the first item were reversed (for example, 1 equal to “Strongly 
disagree” was switched to 5 equal to “Strongly agree” and 2 to 4).  However, the 
reliability level calculated with the reversed scores of the first item was not improved (α 
= .13), so the first item was deleted.   
After deletion of that problematic item, the collective interest measures were all 
highly correlated so they were summed to form a composite scale (α = .88).  Similarly, 
analysis of selective incentive scales showed that social incentive items and material 
incentive items formed scales with modest reliability: social incentive (3 items, α = .68) 
and material incentive (3 items, α = .65).  Both scales were acceptable considering the 
heterogeneous groups of partners in terms of their goals and interests.  But information 
incentive items formed a scale with high reliability (3 items, α = .86).  They were added 
together to form a composite scale with an adequate level of reliability (α = .81).   
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  Internalized norms of participation were measured with five items which 
formed a scale of high reliability (α = .85), and norms of cooperation items also formed a 
scale of high reliability (α = .93).  Participation cost items were also measured with six 
items.  They formed a scale of modest reliability (α = .71). 
 
5.3 Descriptive Analyses 
5.3.1 Demographic Characteristics of Respondents 
Table 5-2 shows the demographic characteristics of respondents.  23 respondents 
were females (25.8%) and 62 males (69.7%).  33 respondents (37.1%) answered that 
they individually participated in the program whereas 50 respondents (57.3%) 
represented organizations.  Only five respondents (5.6%) participated in the program at 
both individual and organizational levels.  Among the 23 female respondents, eight 
females (34.8%) individually participated in the program, whereas 14 females (60.9%) 
represented organizations.  Only one female participated at both levels.  Among 51 male 
respondents, 12 males (23.5%) individually participated, whereas 33 males (64.7%) 
represented organizations.  Two males participated at both levels.    
Respondents’ demographic characteristics did not have a significant influence on 
their contribution, but there was a gender difference in respondents’ personal 
contribution.  Male respondents tended to rate their personal contribution higher (M = 
2.70) than female respondents did (M = 2.09).  Leven test showed that both gender 
groups had approximately equal variance (F = 5.708, sig. = .019), but independent-
samples t test results showed significant gender difference (t = - 2.787, p < .01) in the 
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rates of personal contributions.  However, there were no significant gender differences in 
collective interests, selective benefits, internalized norms, norms of cooperation, and 
participation costs.   
 
Table 5-2  Demographic characteristics of respondents 
Variables n % Variables n % 
Gender 
  F 
  M 
  Missing 
 
 
23 
62 
4 
 
25.8 
69.7 
4.5 
Education 
  College/ Vocational School 
  College Graduate 
  Graduate Degree 
  Missing 
 
 
10 
37 
40 
2 
 
11.2 
41.6 
44.9 
2.2 
Participation Level 
  Individual 
  Organization 
  Both 
  Missing 
 
 
33 
50 
5 
1 
 
37.1 
56.2 
5.6 
1.1 
Income 
  Less than $14,000 
  $25,000-$34,999  
  $35,000-$44,999   
  $45,000-$54,999  
  $55,000-$64,999  
  $65,000-$74,999  
  $75,000-$99,999  
  Over $100,000   
  Missing 
 
 
1 
6 
6 
6 
5 
12 
16 
29 
 
 
1.1 
6.7 
6.7 
6.7 
5.6 
13.5 
18.0 
32.6 
Age 
  30s 
  40s 
  50s 
  60s 
  70s 
  Over 80s 
  Missing 
 
 
4 
28 
31 
12 
6 
3 
5 
 
4.5 
31.5 
34.8 
13.5 
6.7 
3.4 
5.6 
Ethnic Identity 
  African American 
  White 
  Hispanic 
  Asian 
  Others  
  Missing 
 
2 
77 
2 
1 
1 
6 
 
2.2 
86.5 
2.2 
1.1 
1.1 
6.7 
Years in Tulsa Community 
  Less than 9 years 
  10 – 19 Years 
  20 – 29 Years 
  30 – 39 Years 
  40 – 49 Years 
  50 – 59 Years 
  60 – 69 Years 
  Over 70 Years 
  Missing 
 
10 
15 
23 
13 
15 
7 
1 
1 
4 
 
 
11.2 
16.9 
25.8 
14.6 
16.9 
7.9 
1.1 
1.1 
4.5 
 
 
There was also a significant participation level difference in the perception of 
participation cost.  Organizational representatives rated higher participation costs (M = 
2.63, SD = .61) than individual participants did (M = 2.31, SD = .72).  Levens’ test of 
quality of variance showed F value was 2.970 and the significance level was .89.  That 
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means the variances of the two groups were approximately equal.  Independent-sample t 
test results again showed that there was a significant participation cost difference (t= - 
2.097, p < .05) in comparison of both participation level groups.  However, there were 
no significant differences between the two participation groups in collective interests, 
selective benefits, internalized norms of participation, and norms of cooperation.  There 
were no significant differences between the groups in their level of contributions either.     
By age, the respondents were broken into six age groups from a group of 30s to a 
group of 80s.  The majority of respondents were 40s (31.5%) and 50s (34.8%).  The 
arithmetic mean of respondents’ age was 54.1 years old with a standard deviation of 11.4 
years old.  The youngest respondent was 31 years old and the oldest respondent was 87.  
Individual participants’ average age was 58.59 with a standard deviation of 2.44, while 
representatives’ average age was 50.33 with a standard deviation of 1.14.  In addition, 
female respondents’ average age was 49.90 with a standard deviation of 9.89, while 
male’s average age was 55.31 with a standard deviation of 11.46.  For reference, the 
median age of the Tulsa community is 34.5 years old.   
The distribution of respondents’ ethnicity was White (86.5%), Black (2.2%), 
Hispanic (2.2%), Asian (1.1%), and Others (1.1%).  Others include American Indian and 
those who declined to report their ethnicity.  The distribution of ethnicity was White 
(73.9%), Black (16.5%), American Indian (7.7%), and Asian (2.2%).  Hispanic of any 
background was 7.2%.  Educational attainment consisted of five groups, but three top 
groups accounted for 97.8% of the sample.  The group with graduate school degrees had 
the highest number (44.9%), followed by the group with college degrees (41.6%).  
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11.2% had some college or vocational school education.  For reference, 49.1% of the 
Tulsa population had more than some college education or vocational school diplomas.  
50.8% of males had more than college degrees or vocational school diplomas compared 
to 57.3% of females.  Only 9.2% of the Tulsa population had graduate or professional 
degrees.  11% of males had graduate or professional degree compared to 7.5% for 
females. 
The respondents were divided into eight income groups.  57 respondents (64%) 
had an income of over $65,000.  Almost half of them (29 respondents; 32.6%) revealed 
that their income was over $100,000, whereas only one (1.1%) had an income of less 
than $14,000.  For reference, per capita income in Tulsa was $21,534 in 1999.  A male 
full-time year-round worker made an average income of $32,779, whereas a female full-
time year-round worker had an average income of $25,587.  Those who had an income 
of over $100,000 accounted for 9.7% of Tulsa’s population in 1999.  A Chi-square test 
also confirmed that there were gender differences in respondents’ incomes (Chi-square 
13.139, Sig. .041).   
The arithmetic mean of years lived in the Tulsa community was 28.05 years with 
a standard deviation of 15.8, ranging from 1 to 77 years.  The respondents were again 
broken into eight groups by years lived in Tulsa.  The group of those who lived in Tulsa 
for 20-29 years had the highest number (N = 23) and accounted for 25.8% of the sample.  
In summary, the majority of respondents were white males with higher education and 
high income whose age was between 40 and 50.   
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5.3.2 Organizational Characteristics of Respondents 
 53 of 55 representatives (two were missing) answered organizational types.  15 
organizations joined the program from the government sector, 12 from community-based 
organizations sector, 11 organizations from business and industry, 6 from education, 4 
from infrastructure, 1 from health, 1 from the workforce, and 3 from others.  However, 
there were no significant differences among three big organizational groups 
(government, community-based organizations, and business and industry) in collective 
interests, selective benefits, internalized norms of participation, norms of cooperation 
and participation costs.  There were no significant differences among those groups in 
their level of contributions either.  Average years of membership was 4.63 years with a 
standard deviation of 1.42, ranging from 1 to 7 years.  Median length of membership 
was 5 years.  Average number of employees was 414.42, ranging from one to 8000, but 
median was 26.   
 
5.3.3 Descriptive Contribution of Respondents 
Research findings showed that each respondent spent an average of 6.65 hours 
per month on program activities; the median was one hour with a standard deviation of 
22.04 hours, ranging from zero, the minimum hour, to 190 hours, the maximum hours.  
In detail, each respondent spent an average of 2.04 hours (SD = 5.43) attending regularly 
scheduled meetings, an average of 2.94 hours (SD = 17.39) serving on subcommittees, 
an average of 1.05 hours (SD = 2.49) attending events such as conferences or workshops 
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held by Tulsa Project Impact, and only an average of .62 hours (SD = 1.35) attending 
education or training programs held by Tulsa Project Impact (see Table 5-3).     
 
Table 5-3  Descriptive analyses of respondents’ contribution 
Contribution N Mean Min. Max. SD Skewness  Kurtosis 
Time Investments 
         Attending meetings 
         Serving on take forces 
         Attending events 
         Attending programs 
 
85 
85 
85 
85 
6.65 
2.04 
2.94 
1.05 
.62 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
190 
40 
160 
16 
8 
22.04 
5.43 
17.39 
2.49 
1.35 
7.309 
4.985 
8.974 
3.841 
3.064 
60.523 
26.926 
81.872 
17.457 
11.435 
Individual Contribution 
         Donating money 
         Sharing information 
         Providing knowledge 
         Offering materials 
         Loaning equipment 
 
85 
85 
85 
85 
85 
2.54 
1.48 
2.82 
2.63 
1.75 
1.47 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
1.15 
.96 
1.31 
1.45 
1.09 
1.04 
.990 
2.081 
.086 
.322 
1.392 
2.351 
.567 
4.524 
.962 
-1.210 
-.986 
3.774 
Number of Projects 85 2.54 0 12 2.89 1.581 2.317 
Number of task forces 85 .97 0 12 1.67 3.873 21.608 
Organizational contribution 
         Personnel 
         Money 
         Material 
         Equipment 
         Facility 
 
53 
53 
53 
53 
53 
.39 
.68 
.21 
.34 
.28 
.43 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
.31 
.47 
.41 
.48 
.45 
.50 
.517 
-.820 
1.514 
.638 
.992 
.274 
 -.618 
 -1.379 
 .301 
-1.655% 
 -1.058 
 -2.002 
 
 
Survey findings also show that each respondent participated in an average of 2.57 
Tulsa Project Impact program projects with a standard deviation of 2.89, ranging from 
none to 12 projects.  The median was 2 projects.  Similarly, each respondent served on 
an average of  .97 subcommittees with a standard deviation of 1.67, ranging from zero to 
12.  The median was zero subcommittee.  Both had the same range from zero to 12, but 
the number of subcommittees on which respondents served varied more than the number 
of projects, in which they participated.  Skewness and kurtosis of the number of 
subcommittees were 3.873 and 21.608 each.  Distribution of the number of 
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subcommittees was skewed to the right with very thin tail.  Meanwhile, skewness and 
kurtosis of the number of projects were 1.581 and 2.317.  Distribution of the number of 
projects was also skewed to the right and had thicker tails compared to the normal 
distribution.      
Respondents were also asked to rate their individual efforts for facilitating 
community-based hazard mitigation.  For reference, 1 stood for “No contribution”, 3 for 
“Medium contribution”, and 5 for “Major contribution.”  They contributed two items of 
sharing information with other partners for building a safer community (M = 2.82, SD = 
1.31) and providing knowledge or skills needed to implement Tulsa Project Impact 
projects (M = 2.63, SD = 1.45) more than the remaining three items.  Meanwhile, three 
items including donating money to support program activities (M = 1.48, SD = .96), 
offering materials needed to implement Project Impact projects (M = 1.75, SD = 1.09), 
and loaning equipment needed to implement Project Impact projects (M = 1.47, SD = 
1.04) were rated relatively lower by respondents.  These five items formed a composite 
scale with an average score of 2.54 (SD = 1.15).  Skewness and kurtosis of the 
composite scale were .990 and .567 each.  Thus, distribution of the composite scale 
indicating personal contribution was also skewed to the right with thicker tails.    
Organization’s resource contribution was classified into five categories, and 
measured with a binominal scale (0-1) respectively: providing personnel resources (M = 
.68), giving direct funding support (M = .21), offering materials (M = .34), loaning 
equipment (M = .28), and providing organizational facilities (M= .43).  Personnel varied 
the least and was most commonly contributed by organizations.  In contrast, money 
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varied most and was least commonly contributed by organizations.  In addition, Pearson 
Chi-square test was used to find patterns in organizations’ resource contributions.  Table 
5-4 shows test findings.  Personnel resource type had relationships with material (Chi-
square = 13.469, α < .005) and facility (Chi-square = 6.755, α < .01) resource types.  
Material, equipment, and facility had relationships with each other: material had a 
relationship with equipment (Chi-square = 9.977, α < .01), equipment with facility (Chi-
square = 11.411, α < .01), and facility again with material (Chi-square = 6.009, α < 
.025).   
 
Table 5-4  Chi-square test about organization’s resource contribution 
 Personnel Money Material Equipment 
Money 1.133 (.287)      
Material 13.469 (.000) ** 3.267 (.195)    
Equipment 3.373 (.061)  5.831 (.054)  9.977 (.003) **  
Facility 6.755 (.009) * 1.356 (.508)  6.009 (.015) † 11.411 (.001) ** 
Chi-square (Probability); ** refers to α < .005; * refers to α < .010; † refers to α < .025. 
 
5.4 Test of the Proposed Model 
The collective interest model described in the five hypotheses and summarized in 
Figure 3-1 was tested by inspecting the correlations (see Table 5-5 and Table 5-6), and 
by conducting hierarchical regression analyses, a specialized form of multivariate 
analysis.  Hierarchical regression analyses were used because dependent variables could 
not be added together to form a composite scale for a dependent variable and because the 
number of observations was not large enough to add all predictors into the regression 
equation.  First, time investment was considered as the most reliable and valid indicator 
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of partners’ contribution.  But it turned out to be the least reliable variable and 
inconsistent with other contribution indicators.  Time investment was strongly correlated 
with personal contribution (r = .416, p < .01), but when these items were added together 
to form a composite scale, their reliability was low (α = .46) as discussed above.  
Second, R square may be overestimated when the data sets have few cases (N) relative 
to number of predictors (p).  For this study, the number of cases was 89, so the 
maximum number of predictors was 8 including constant (N/p > 10). 
The most critical problem might be the measurement of time investment.  Less 
than half of respondents (42 out of 88) answered that they served on more than one 
subcommittee, but when they were asked to rate the best estimate of the number of hours 
per month, their estimate of time investment serving on subcommittees indicated zero: 
that is to say, they were not active at the point of survey, but still said they had served on 
subcommittees before.  Some people might answer zero for their time contribution when 
they were not active, whereas the number of subcommittees was a fact, which could not 
be changed, and so was reliable.  Similarly, some partners answered that they 
participated in a few projects, but their time investment was measured as zero.  So 
another critical problem might come from omitting items, which must be considered in 
the measurement of partners’ time investment in program activities.  In addition, poor 
question wording might have contributed to this validity problem.  In summary, there 
was critical inconsistency in measuring time investment items.   
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Considering this measurement problem, I decided to drop time investment as the 
dependent variable and use other contribution indicators for regression analyses.  This 
decision was supported by the correlations calculated among multi-item scales and 
individual items displayed in Table 5-5, which shows that few predictors were 
significantly correlated with time investment.  Only information incentives (r = .231) 
and internalized norms of participation (r = .239) were significantly correlated with time 
contribution at the level of .05, but these predictors did not explain time investment in 
the regression analysis (R2 = .059 for both variables).   
Meanwhile, the number of projects and the number of subcommittees were better 
presented by Spearman’s Rho than Pearson’s correlation coefficient because neither had 
a normal distribution (Norusis, 2000).  Analyses show that, overall, the size of 
Spearman’s correlation coefficients were larger than that of Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients, but their correlation coefficients were similar in size order.  For example, 
both analyses identified information incentives as the variable with the highest 
correlation: Spearman’s correlation coefficient was .347 at the .01 level (see Table 5-6) 
and Pearson’s correlation coefficient of it was .249 at the .05 level each (see Table 5-5).  
But entry of information incentives into the regression equation did not significantly 
raise the predictable variance (R2 change was .068).     
Both correlation analyses show that the number of projects and personal 
contribution was significantly correlated with predictors and used for testing the five 
hypotheses.  The first hypothesis - that partners’ contributions will increase when the 
estimated value of collective interest increases - was not supported by the correlation of 
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respondents’ contribution with collective interests (r = .091).  Collective interests were 
defined as a function of problem severity (measured by risk perception, community 
vulnerability, and economic benefits), program effectiveness, and individual efficacy in 
solving problems as previously discussed.  The first assumption was that the more 
serious people are about problems, the more likely they will join and take preventive 
action (as in environmental movements or protest against nuclear power uses).  Risk 
perception and perception of community vulnerability were considered as indicators of 
problem severity.  Surprisingly, however, risk perception and community vulnerability 
among collective interest variables had no significant relationship with either the number 
of projects or personal contribution.  In contrast, economic benefits (r = .310, p < .01) 
and individual efficacy (r = .297, p < .01) were significantly correlated with the number 
of mitigation projects in which respondents participated (see Table 5-6).  Economic 
benefits (r = .293), program effectiveness (r = .326), and individual efficacy (r = .363) 
were significantly correlated with respondents’ personal contribution at the .01 level.  
These three variables were significantly correlated with each other: economic benefits 
had a significant relationship with project effectiveness (r = .727) and individual efficacy 
(r = ..753), while project effectiveness correlated with individual efficacy (r = .685) at 
the .01 level.  Thus, they were all added together to form a composite scale (α = .88) and 
used as a collective interest variable which was significantly correlated with the number 
of projects (r = .224, p < .05).  
Spearman’s correlation analysis identified economic benefit as the variable with 
the third highest correlation, but its entry to the equation did not raise R2 (by .000) at all. 
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Individual efficacy, which was the variable with the fourth highest correlation, also 
barely raised R2 (by .003).  The regression analysis shows that collective interest did not 
significantly influence respondents’ participation in projects, barely raising R2 (by .006). 
Similarly, no collective interest variables significantly influenced respondents’ personal 
contribution (individual efficacy raised R2 by .001 and program effectiveness by .000).  
The collective interest variable with a composite scale alone explained the variance in 
personal contribution by .092.  But individual efficacy and program effectiveness 
variables better explained the variance when they were entered into the regression 
equation alone: R2 was .126 with the entry of individual efficacy alone and .106 with the 
entry of program effectiveness.  This analysis indicated rather that they had a direct 
effect on personal contribution.  When it was added to the equation with four predictors 
of information incentives, internalized norms, individual efficacy, and material 
incentives in correlation size order, economic benefits created in the biggest change (by 
.017) from R2 = .290 to R2 = .307 (F(6, 77) = 5.679, p < .01).  But economic benefit 
alone explained the variance in personal contribution (R2 = .089): that is to say, it also 
had a small direct effect on personal contribution.  Consequently, the first hypothesis 
was not supported by any correlations with collective interests.   
However, correlation and regression analyses show that the second hypothesis – 
that partners’ contributions will increase with their perceptions of selective benefits - 
was supported by a significant correlation between personal contribution and predictors: 
information incentives (r = .448) and material incentives (r = .329) at the .01 level.  
Information incentives (β = .463), which was the variable with the second highest 
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correlation, made its entry into the equation, raising R2 by .214, but material incentives 
(β = .087), which had the fourth highest correlation, barely raised R2 (by .005).  Both 
were significantly correlated (r = .526, p < .01) and added to form a composite scale (α = 
.81).  Selective benefits raised the predictable variance in personal contribution from R2 
= .203 for internalized norms alone to R2 = .282 (F(2, 81) = 15.885, p < .01).  In 
addition, selective benefits had a significant relationship with the number of projects (r = 
.353, p < .01), and the variable with the highest correlation with it.  Selective benefits 
explained the predictable variance in the number of projects by R2 = .124 (F(1, 84) = 
11.937, p < .01).  So selective benefits better explained respondents’ personal 
contribution than their participation in the number of projects.  Multiple regression 
analyses with stepwise inclusion also supported the hypothesis that selective benefits 
was the best predictor for respondents’ personal contribution (R2 = .222, β = .471, p < 
.01).  Moreover, the size of the correlation with personal contribution (r = .448, p < .01) 
was larger than with the number of projects (r = .353).  This finding indicated that this 
analysis might have a possible confounding effect on correlated methods variance.   
Lindell and Whitney (1995) discussed this problem.  They said: “correlated 
methods variance can arise from common sources, response format similarity, and social 
desirability” (p. 442).  This problem occurs because subjects were asked to do a self-
estimate of their contribution, and they tried to make a good impression.  Table 5-7 
shows the comparisons between the correlations of the number of projects with 
predictors and that of personal contribution with the same predictors.  Interestingly, 
correlation coefficients in both columns had a similar order, but the size of the 
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correlations of personal contribution with predictors was larger than that of the number 
of projects with the same predictors.  This is the evidence that correlated methods 
variance presented in the data. 
 
Table 5-7  Comparison of correlation coefficients 
 Contribution Indicators 
 Number of Project Personal Contribution 
Collective Interests 
    Risk Perception 
    Community Vulnerability 
    Economic Benefit 
    Program Effectiveness 
    Group/ Individual Efficacy 
.210 
.005 
.115 
.262* 
.174 
.299** 
.303** 
.049 
.162 
.293** 
.326** 
.363** 
Selective Benefits 
    Social Incentives 
    Information Incentives 
    Material Incentives 
.353** 
.144 
407** 
.201 
.448** 
.120 
.448** 
.329** 
Internalized Norms .327** .460** 
Norms of Cooperation .260 .311** 
Participation Costs -.282* -.273* 
*  p < 0.05.  ** p < 0.01. 
 
The third hypothesis – that partners’ contributions will decrease as their 
perceived participation costs increases - was not well supported by the least significant 
correlations between participation costs and two contribution indicators: the number of 
projects (r = - .281) and personal contribution (r = - .273) at the .05 level.  As expected, 
it was significantly and negatively correlated with both contribution indicators.  But its 
entry into the regression equation did not raise R2.  Participation costs alone explained 
the predictable variance in the number of projects by .079 and in personal contribution 
by .075.  With its entry into the equation, participation costs raised the predictable 
variance in the number of projects by .015 (from R2 = .195, F(3, 78) = 6.308, p < .01 for 
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internalized norms, information incentives, and individual efficacy to R2 = .210, F(4, 77) 
= 5.127, p < .01 for them all), but its standardized coefficient was -.139 at p > .25.  Thus, 
it did not adequately explain the variance in the number of projects.  In addition, 
participation costs barely raised the variance in personal contribution (from R2 = .291, 
F(2, 79) = 16.182, p < .01 for both internalized norms and information incentives to R2 = 
.293, F(3, 78) = 10.767, p < .01 for them all) when it was added to internalized norms 
and information incentives.   
However, there was a significant participation level difference in the perception 
of participation costs.   Participation costs alone explained the variance in organizational 
representatives’ personal contribution, raising R2 by .75, but its standardized coefficient 
was -.274 at the .05 level.  Meanwhile, participation costs alone explained the variance 
in individual participants’ personal contribution by .084, but its standardized coefficient 
was -.291 at p = .113.  Consequently, the third hypothesis was well supported by the 
model when it was applied only to organizational representatives.   
The fourth hypothesis – that partners’ contributions will increase with their 
conformation to norms of cooperation - was supported by a correlation between norms 
of cooperation and predictors: the number of project (r = .257, p < .05) and personal 
contribution (r = .311, p < .01).  But norms of cooperation did not raise the variance in 
the number of projects a bit (by .000) when it was added to predictors of information 
incentives, internalized norms, economic benefit, and individual efficacy in correlation 
size order.  Instead, adjusted R square shrank by .009.  Norms of cooperation explained 
the variance in personal contribution by .004 when it was added to predictors of 
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internalized norms, information incentives, individual efficacy, material incentives, and 
program effectiveness (all explained the variance by .288, F(5, 77) = 6.220, p < .01).  
However, norms of cooperation alone explained the predictable variance in the number 
of projects by .068 and personal contribution by .097.  Interestingly, norms of 
cooperation alone explained the variance in organizational contribution by .179 (F(1, 48) 
= 10.463, p < .01).  Internalized norms (r = .480), norms of cooperation (r = .423), and 
individual efficacy (r = .409) were the variables with the top three highest correlation 
with organizational contribution in order, and together they explained the variance in 
organizational contribution by .250.  Norms of cooperation raised R square by .021 
(from R2 = .227, F(1, 48) = 18.084, p < .01 for internalized norms alone to R2 = .248, 
F(2, 47) = 7.734, p < .01 for both variables). Consequently, norms of cooperation 
provided a better explanation for organizational resource contribution than the individual 
level of contribution.  
The fifth hypothesis – that partners’ contributions will increase with their 
individual norms when their risk perception is high - was supported by a significant 
correlation between the internalized norms variable and variables from two categories of 
contribution variables.  The internalized norms variable was significantly correlated with 
number of projects (r = .327) and personal contribution (r = .460) variables at the .01 
level.  Interestingly, it was also correlated with time investment (r = .239, p < .05).   
Internalized norms was the variable with the second highest correlation with the number 
of projects and the highest correlation with personal contribution and with organizational 
contribution.  It alone explained the variance in the number of projects (R2 = .018, β = 
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.155, p < .20), personal contribution (R2 = .200, β = .448, p < .01), and organizational 
contribution (R2 = .227, β = .476, p < .01).  When using composite scales, its entry into 
the regression equation raised the variance of the number of projects by .023 (from R2 = 
.136, F(1, 82) = 12.989, p < .01 for selective incentives alone to R2 = .160, F(2, 81) = 
7.702, p < .01 for both variables).  Multiple regression analyses with stepwise inclusion 
also supported internalized norms as the second best predictor for respondents’ personal 
contribution (R2 = .064, β = .292, p < .01).  Similar to norms of cooperation, internalized 
norms of participation better explained the predictable variance in organizational 
contribution than the other two variances.   
Finally, the complete collective interest model explained the predictable variance 
in respondents’ personal contribution by .303 (F(5, 75) = 6.531, p < .01).  As discussed, 
selective incentives (β = .360, p < .01) and internalized norms (β = .332, p < .05) were 
identified as the two best predictors of respondents’ personal contribution.   
Statistical diagnostic tests were conducted to determine if the assumptions of that 
regression model have been met: if the assumptions are correct, the distribution of the 
residuals should be approximately normal with constant variance.  Histogram of 
standardized residuals in Figure 5-1 shows that despite its shape not being ideally 
symmetrical, its curve was almost normal.  First, multicollinearity analysis was 
conducted to test if there was a significant multicollinearity problem: that is to say, if 
any of the tolerances were small (less than .1).  Analysis showed all tolerance levels 
were over .1 and all VIF values were below 10 (see Table 5-8).  Second, residual plot 
analysis was conducted to test for heteroskedasticity – a condition in which the errors in 
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the regression model do not have common variance.  Scatterplots of residuals in Figure 
5-2 show a residual scatter plot with a divergent or convergent fan shape, which implies 
heteroskedasticity which often occurs when cross-section or time series data are 
collected with samples varying greatly in size (Gupta, 1994).  Tulsa Project Impact 
recruited partners from various social and economic sectors, and this heterogeneity in 
terms of different self-interests and goals may cause heteroskedasticity.         
 
Table 5-8  Characteristics of determinants 
  
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model  B Std. Error β t Sig. Tolerance
 
 
VIF 
(Constant) 1.048 1.061 .988 .326
 Collective Interests -.110 .265 -.059 -.414 .680 .453 2.209
 Selective Incentive .464 .152 .360 3.053 .003 .668 1.497
 Internalized Norms .426 .185 -.123 2.298 .024 .445 2.247
 Norms of Cooperation -.147 .188 -.115 -.784 .436 .434 2.302
 Participation Costs -.213 .196 -.332 -1.085 .281 .723 1.384
VIF refers to variance inflation factor. 
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Figure 5-1  Standardized residuals 
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Figure 5-2  Scatterplots of standardized residuals 
 
 
95
  
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This research investigated the relationship between partners’ contributions to the 
program and collective action variables including collective interests, selective 
incentives, internalized norms, norms of cooperation, and participation costs.  This study 
tested the collective interest model.  Correlation analyses were conducted to identify 
predictors for partners’ contributions.  Both independent-sampled t tests and Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) tests were performed to investigate mean differences over 
determinants among groups with different respondents’ demographic characteristics.  
Finally, hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to test hypotheses and discuss 
findings and statistical meaning.    
 
6.2 Research Findings and Discussions 
This study examined the collective interest model, which predicts partners’ 
contribution from their collective interests (in terms of problem severity, program 
effectiveness, and individual efficacy), perceived selective benefits, internalized norms, 
norms of cooperation, and participation costs.  Table 5-9 shows the results of an 
equation predicting partners’ contribution.  The model shows that two of the five 
independent variables were statistically significant predictors of future partners’ 
contributions to collective action for community-based hazard mitigation.  They are 
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selective incentives and internalized norms of participation.  These variables had 
standardized regression coefficients between -.414 and 3.053 and taken together the 
model explains about 30% of the variance in partners’ contributions.   
Since there are 80 observations, the relevant t value for evaluating the 
significance of the six estimated coefficients (including constant) at a 95% level of 
significance is 1.658.  Thus, coefficients, which have t value larger than 1.658, are 
statistically significant.   
   
6.2.1 Collective Interests 
 In the early collective action literature, the relationship between collective action 
and collective interests was regarded as automatic.  It was natural to think that those who 
have high stakes related to collective goods would  join actions.  But all those who are 
interested in collective goods do not necessarily participate in collective action.  Instead 
some of them may free ride.  So the first hypothesis was whether partners’ contributions 
were related to their collective interests.    
Research findings show that there were no statistically significant relationships 
between partners’ contributions and their collective interests.  Correlation analyses 
showed that collective interests were significantly correlated with personal contribution 
(r = .303, p < .01).  In the contribution model to test the hypotheses, however, collective 
interests did not explain the variance in personal contribution at all (R2 change = .000).  
Its standardized coefficient was -.059 and t value was -.414 at p = .680 (see Table 5-8).  
Its t value was much smaller than 1.658, so it was not statistically significant.   
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 Partners may be continually informed about multi-hazards and community 
vulnerabilities through meetings, news, training programs, and events such as workshop 
or conferences.  So the relationship between partners’ contribution and their risk 
perception or perception of community vulnerabilities was expected to be significant.  
Contrary to expectation, risk perception and community vulnerability were not 
significantly correlated with any contribution variables, and could not explain any 
variance in respondents’ contribution variables.  But that does not mean both did not 
influence partners’ contribution.  Correlation analyses show that both had significant 
relationships with other independent variables including the two best predictors of 
contribution: information incentives and internalized norms (see Table 5-5).  That means 
both variables may indirectly influence partners’ contributions.  
 To identify further the relationship of their perceived level of problem severity 
with contribution, the first four items in community vulnerabilities which were selected 
to measure perceived level of exposure (people, property, utility facilities, and 
infrastructure) were combined to form a composite scale (α = .85).  Interestingly, 
perceived level of exposure was significantly correlated with personal contribution (r = 
.216, p < .05), and alone explained 4.7% of the variance in personal contribution.  Its t 
value was 2.018 at the 95% level of significance, so it was statistically significant.  That 
means partners’ contributions can be partially explained by their perceived level of 
problem severity.  Other subvariables such as perceived level of hazard adjustments or 
community capacity were not significantly related to partners’ contributions.  
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 Project Impact continually provided partners with information related to goals 
and values.  Tulsa Project Impact also provided its partners with the 2020 vision of a 
disaster resilient community to give them hope.  Aguirre (2002) also discussed such a 
strong vision as functioning as a magnet to draw stakeholders into the collective action.  
Economic benefit was the incentive to join the program.  It was correlated with both the 
number of projects (r = .262, p < .05) and personal contribution (r = .293, p < .01).  It 
alone explained 6.95% of the variance in the number of projects and 8.6% of the 
variance in personal contribution.  
 Klandermans (1984) argued that the probability of program success increases 
individuals’ participation.  So partners’ perception of program effectiveness was 
expected to have a relationship to their contributions.  Correlation analyses show that it 
was significantly correlated only with partners’ personal contribution (r = .326, p < .01), 
and it alone could explain 10.6% of the variance in personal contribution.  But it raised 
R square by .016 when it was added to individual efficacy.  Program effectiveness alone 
better explained the variance in personal contribution.   
 Klandermans (1984) again argues that individuals’ participation is related to their 
perception of individual influence on change.  Other research findings have also 
confirmed his argument.  In this study, individual efficacy was found to be the variable 
with the highest correlation to personal contribution (r = . 363, p < .01), and it alone 
could explain 12.6% of the variance in personal contribution.   
 There were no participation level differences and demographic differences in 
contribution and collective interests.  When these five collective interest variables were 
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all combined to test the first hypothesis, none of them was statistically significant.  All 
together they could explain 16.7% of the variance in personal contribution, 11.7% of the 
variance in the number of subcommittees, and 10.3% of the variance in the number of 
projects.    
 
6.2.2 Selective Benefits 
 If collective interests was not a good predictor to explain the variance in partners’ 
contributions, what else motivates them to contribute?  They need incentives or norms to 
trigger action.  Olson (1965) argues that selective incentives was the best predictor of 
participation.  So the second hypothesis was whether partners’ perception of selective 
incentives was related to their contributions.   
Three types of incentives were identified: social, information, and material 
incentives.  The social incentives alone explained only 2.1% of the variance in the 
number of projects and 1.4% of the variance in personal contribution. But they were not 
statistically significant.  That means social respect or award opportunities for 
performance did not influence partners’ contributions.   
Information incentives alone explained 20.1% of the variance in personal 
contribution.  That was the largest explanation for a single variable.  This research 
finding confirmed Gillespie and his colleague’s findings that organizations join alliances 
because of their interests in other partners’ missions and tasks and DRC’s research 
findings that partners join a program to obtain hazard or hazard mitigation information.  
Its t value was 4.593 (p < .05), and it was statistically significant.  Research findings also 
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show that those who were more interested in information participated in a greater 
number of program projects.  For reference, 25 out of 89 respondents answered that they 
did not participate in any projects.  Their mean score in information incentives was 2.97, 
while those who participated in more than one project showed higher interests in 
material incentives (M = 3.77).  Independent-sample t test results supported this 
argument (t = 3.400, p < .01).  Thus, the argument that information incentives influence 
partners’ contribution was supported. 
In the interorganization literature it was well documented that organizations 
always look for resources and formulate alliances to secure resources.  The research 
findings confirmed this theory.  Material incentives alone explained 10.8% of the 
variance in personal contribution, but only 4% of the variance in the number of projects 
or .8% of the variance in the number of subcommittees.  That does not mean partners 
who were looking for resources were necessarily led to participation in projects or 
serving on subcommittees.  However, it seems those who are more interested in material 
incentives are more likely to contribute.  As discussed above, those who did not 
participate in projects had a mean score in material incentives of 2.34, while partners 
who participated in more than one project showed higher mean score in material 
incentives (M = 2.84).  Independent-sample t test results also support this argument (t = 
2.148, p < .05).  
Consequently, selective incentives explained the variance in partner’s personal 
contribution.  A series of social, information, and material incentives were identified.  
Correlation analyses show that social incentives was inconsistent with the other two 
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variables and dropped in the regression analyses.  The remaining two variables were 
added into the predictive equation, and selective incentives alone explained 12.4% of the 
variance in the number of projects and 20% of the variance in personal contribution.  Its 
entry into the contribution model raised R square by .079, and its t value was 3.053 at 
the 95% level of significance.  It was considerably larger than 1.658, and statistically 
significant.   
 
6.2.3 Participation Costs 
 In the previous research of collective action, participation costs was consistently 
related with people’s participating behavior (in protest or political events) in the 
expected negative direction.  That means people tend to balance net benefits from their 
participation with net costs.  So the third hypothesis was whether partners’ contribution 
was related to their perception of participation costs. 
 The results of correlation analyses support the hypothesis that participation costs 
had a significant relationship to partners’ contribution (r = -.273, p < .05).  However, the 
results of hierarchical regression analyses show that participation costs did not totally 
explain the variance in partners’ personal contributions.  It had smallest correlation with 
personal contribution (see Table 5-5).  Its entry into the equation did not raise R square 
significantly.  R square change was .011, but even that change was larger than R square 
change by other variables (norms of cooperation raised R square by 0.005 and collective 
interests by .002) in the model.   
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 Consequently, participation costs was not a good predictor for partners’ 
contributions to community-based hazard mitigation.  Previous analyses show us three 
things.  First, the majority of respondents were white males, who were well educated and 
earned high income.  Second, there was a significant gender difference in their personal 
contribution.  Independent-sample t test results show that males contribute more than 
females.  There was also a significant gender difference in income (Chi-square = 
.13.139, p < .05) and education (Chi-square = 8.561, p < .05).  Third, there was also a 
significant participation level difference in their perception of participation costs.  
Organizational representatives perceived more costs than individuals.  These findings do 
not necessarily explain why participation costs was significantly related with partners’ 
contribution, but they may provide an indicator that participation costs can possibly 
influence contribution. 
 
6.2.4 Norms of Cooperation 
 Meanwhile, many social exchange theorists and game theorists have discussed 
various models to explain why people or organizations cooperate.  They commonly 
argue that cooperation provides in more benefits to both parties than defection, and 
norms are generated among parties.  Emergent norms are reproduced and (negatively or 
positively) reinforced by norm beneficiaries.  Such norms are the kind of game rules 
which monitor, guide, or enforce behaviors for maximizing mutual benefits.  Not every 
norm necessarily sanctions violators.  So the fourth hypothesis asked whether partners’ 
contributions were related to the norms of cooperation.      
103
  
 Research findings show that norms of cooperation alone explained 9.7% of the 
variance in partners’ personal contribution.  Its t value was 2.947 at the 99% level of 
significance, and larger than 2.660.  So it was statistically significant.  Partners may 
participate because they believe it is fair to participate as much as others do.  When it 
was added to other entries in the equation, however, norms of cooperation did not 
explain the variance in personal contribution.  Its entry raised R square only by .005.  So 
it did not support the hypothesis in the collective interest model.    
 
6.2.5 Internalized Norms of Participation 
 Mileti (1999) argued that social expectation or norms are more likely to guide 
individuals’ hazard adjustments, rather than their rational judgment of vulnerabilities or 
the effectiveness of hazard mitigation measures.  This has been sharply contested by 
other rational choice theorists’ argument that individuals act purposively.  So the fifth 
hypothesis asked whether partners’ contributions were related to their internalized norms 
of participation.  In addition, Schwartz (1992) argued that internalized norms do not 
necessarily lead to action.  It needs mediates such as problem severity.  Thus, the 
assumptions state that those who perceive problem severity more likely feel obliged to 
participate and those who feel obliged to participate are more likely to contribute. 
 First, correlation analyses show that there was a significant correlation between 
problem severity and internalized norms.  The size of the correlation was the highest 
among all correlations for this study.  Regression analysis results also supported the first 
assumption. Collective interests alone explained 43.7% of the variance in partners’ 
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feeling of obligation to participate (F(1, 80) = 61.978, p < .01).  That means partners’ 
perception of problem severity may possibly influence their feelings of obligation to take 
action.   
Second, regression results again show that individualized norms alone explain 
21.2% of the variance in partners’ personal contribution.  Its addition to selective 
incentives in the equation raised R square by .061.  Its t value was 2.621 at the 99% level 
of significance so it was statistically significant.  But this does not mean partners’ 
internalized norms necessarily influence their contributions.    
 Hierarchical regression analyses show that both variables together explained 
21.6% of the variance in personal contribution.  But internalized norms alone explained 
21.6% of that variance.  The entry of collective interest into the equation did not raise r 
square at all (by .000).  Instead, both adjusted R square and F value dropped by .06 and 
11.157 respectively as result of its entry.  However, their F(2, 79) value was still 10.901 
at the 99% level of significance and much larger than F(2, 60, p < .01) = 4.98. Thus, this 
model was statistically significant.  That means both variables together may possibly 
influence partners’ personal contribution.  Schwartz’s (1992) action theory was also 
confirmed.       
 
6.3 Conclusion and Limitations 
 Selective benefits and internalized norms of participation were the two most 
important variables that influenced Tulsa Project Impact partners’ contributions to 
collective mitigation action.  These two key findings have considerable implication for 
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collective mitigation action issues.  First, the majority of respondents said they 
participated in Tulsa Project Impact because they wanted to learn about other partners’ 
mission and tasks, obtain hazard or hazard adjustment information, or have opportunities 
to exchange resources with other partners.  Partners’ contributions are strongly 
correlated with their perception of selective benefits.  In fact, many Project Impact 
communities attempted to develop incentive packages in order to recruit partners 
(Wachtendorf, 2001).  Tulsa Project Impact also developed and provided financial and 
technical incentives for recruiting partners and facilitating mitigation projects (e.g., tax 
incentives to encourage safer shelter).  Thus, this finding may indicate that the Tulsa 
Project Impact program successfully used incentives for recruiting partners and 
encouraging them to contribute.    
 Second, many respondents felt obliged to participate in collective mitigation 
action.  Their conformation to internalized norms of participation increased contribution, 
but the causal relationship of internalized norms with contribution is unclear because we 
do not know exactly what aroused their feelings of obligation.  For example, the 
majority of respondents were characteristically well-educated and middle-aged white 
male community leaders with a high income.  They are community leaders and may 
volunteer for community-based hazard mitigation in order to play their social roles as 
leaders.  Other enforcing factors may be education through campaigns, conferences, or 
workshops.  Education about hazard and hazard adjustments may change people’s 
values, preferences, interests or advantages related to community-based hazard 
mitigation.  So incentives for contributions may be collective interest in terms of 
106
  
problem severity and economic benefits.  Actually, the causal relationship of partners’ 
collective interest to their contributions was mediated by internalized norms of 
participation.  Collective interest did not directly influence partners’ contribution, but it 
is highly correlated with internalized norms of participation.  Thus, research findings 
imply that education may influence partners’ feelings of obligation to participate and 
contribute.   
 There are also some limitations to my study of collective action for community-
based hazard mitigation.  First, this study’s most critical problem came from the cross-
sectional, one-shot research design.  Cross-section study is not a good method to infer 
cause and effect relationships.  Finkel and Muller (1998) discussed this causal inference 
problem in the cross-sectional.  They said “Causal inference in the cross-sectional case 
has been hampered by the inability to use perceptions of the costs and benefits of 
participation at a given time to predict behavior that necessarily occurred in the past and 
by ambiguities associated with analyzing behavioral intentions instead of actual protest 
participation (p. 46).”  Considering this limitation of the cross-sectional data, all 
statistics and research findings present only the potential presence of relationships.  For 
example, research findings indicating that partners’ perceived selective incentives and 
internalized norms of participation had a significant relationship to their contributions do 
not necessarily mean both caused their contribution.    
The second critical problem came from the rational choice model itself.  Most 
rational choice models were based on the belief that human nature is rational and 
possesses perfect information (Zey, 1998).  In reality, humans do not always act 
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rationally and it is impossible to obtain perfect information to calculate net benefits and 
net costs.  Rather most individuals rely on bounded rationality to judge, so rational 
choice is already theoretically flawed.  These facts explain why most rational choice 
models do not empirically explain complex behaviors of players.  For this study, 
however, the collective interest model was selected for the purpose of identifying 
predictors of collective action and their basic relationships, not for mathematical 
purposes to prove that their causes and effect relationships are true.   
The third critical problem came from the unit of analysis.  Rational choice is a 
way of explaining collective action on the basis of individual behaviors.  So rational 
choice theorists perceive individuals as the basic unit of analysis because only 
individuals correctly present preferences or beliefs in order (Zey, 1998).  Organizations 
or groups do not have preferences as individuals do.  Otherwise, rational choice cannot 
be predicted.  For example, Elster (1982) treated an organization as one decision maker. 
Theoretically, however, it may be controversial to apply findings at the micro level such 
as individual attitudes to social phenomena at the macro level such as collective 
mitigation action.  Such an individual methodology has long been criticized by other 
scholars.  According to them, organizational decisions cannot be the same as individual 
ones because organizational decisions require more complex procedures in terms of 
power structure, communication networks, etc.  Thus, social collectivities such as dyads 
are the more appropriate unit of analysis for collective action.   
This one-shot case study is subject to research design problems.  Nevertheless, 
this study provides empirical data and, although very limited, research findings provide 
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information for scientific understanding of collective action for community-based hazard 
mitigation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
109
  
REFERENCES 
 
 Aguirre, B. E. (2002). Sustainable development as collective surge. Social 
Science Quarterly, 83, 101-118. 
 
Aguirre, B. E., Wenger, D., & Vigo, G. (1998). A test of the emergent norm 
theory of collective behavior. Sociological Forum, 13, 301-332. 
 
Alesch, D. J. & Petak, W. J. (2001). Overcoming obstacles to implementation 
earthquake hazard mitigation policies. Presented at First Annual IIASA-DPRI Meeting. 
Laxenburg, Austria.  
 
 Andreoni, J. (1988). Giving with impure altruism. Journal of Political Economy, 
97, 1447-1458. 
 
Armstrong, M. J. (2000a). Back to the future: Charting the course for Project 
Impact. Natural Hazards Review, 1, 138-144. 
 
Armstrong, M. J. (2000b). The political economy of hazards. Environmental 
Hazards, 2, 53-55. 
 
Auf Der Heide, E. (1989). Disaster response: Principles of preparation and 
coordination. http://orgmail2.coe-dmha.org/dr/Images/Main.swf. 
 
Axelrod, R. (1980). More effective choice in the prisoner's dilemma. The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24, 379-403. 
 
Axelrod, R. (1984). The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Axelrod, R. (1986). An evolutionary approach to norms. The American 
Political Science Review, 80, 1095-1111. 
 
Barnard, C. (1938). Functions of the executive. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.   
 
Barry, B. & Hardin, R. (1982). Rational man and irrational society? Beverly 
Hills, CA: Sage. 
 
Barton, A. (1969). Communities in disaster. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and 
Company. 
 
 
110
  
 Beatley, T. (1994). Ethical land use: Principles of policy and planning. 
Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.  
 
Beatley, T. (1998). The vision of sustainable communities. In R. J. Burby (Ed.), 
Cooperating with nature: Confronting natural hazards with land-use planning for 
sustainable communities (pp. 233-262). Washington, DC: Joseph Henry.  
 
 Bendor, J. & Mookerjee, D. (1987). Institutional structure and the logic of 
ongoing collective action. American Political Science Review, 81, 129-154 
 
Berke, P. R. (1998). Reducing natural hazard risks through state growth 
management. Journal of American Planning Association, 64, 76-87. 
 
Berke, P., Kartez, J., & Wenger, D. (1993). Recovery after disaster: Achieving 
sustainable development, mitigation and equity. Disasters, 17, 92-109.
 
Birkland, T. A. (1997). After disaster: Agenda setting, public policy, and 
forecasting events. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
 
Bogdanor, V. (1987). The Blackwell encyclopedia of political institution. New 
York: Blackwell Reference.   
 
Böhm-Bawerk, E. (1962). Positive theory of capital. Translated by William 
Smart. London: Macmillan and Co. 
 
 Britton, N. R., Norman, C. C., & Correy, B. (1994). Stress coping and emergency 
disaster volunteers: A discussion of some relevant factors. In R. R. Dynes & K. J. 
Tierney (Eds.), Disasters, collective behavior, and social organization (pp. 128-144). 
Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press.  
 
Buchanan, J. A. & Tullock, G. (1962). The calculus of consent. Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press.  
 
Buckle, P. R., Mars, G., & Smale, R. S. (2000). New approaches to assessing 
vulnerability and resilience. Australian Journal of Emergency Management, 15, 8-14. 
 
Burby, R. J. (1998). Side-bar 1-2: A five-step planning process. In R. J. Burby 
(Ed.), Cooperating with nature: Confronting natural hazards with land-use planning for 
sustainable communities (pp. 20-25). Washington, DC: Joseph Henry.  
 
Burby, R. J., May, P., & Paterson, R. C. (1998). Improving compliance with 
regulations: Choices and outcomes for local government. Journal of the American 
Planning Association, 64, 324-334. 
 
111
  
Burgess, P. M. & Robinson, J. A. (1969). Alliance and the theory of collective 
action: A simulation of coalition processes. Midwest Journal of Political Science, 12, 
194-218. 
 
Burton, I., Kates, R. J. & White, G. F. (1978). The environment as hazard. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Changnon, S., Changnon, D., Fosse, E. R., Hoganson, T., Roth, R. J. Sr., & 
Totsch, J. (1997). Effects of recent weather extremes on the insurance industry: Major 
implications for the atmospheric sciences. Bulletin of the American Meteorological 
Society, 78, 425–435. 
 
Coleman, J. S. (1990). Foundation of social theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Comfort, L. K. (1999). Shared risk: Complex systems in seismic response. New 
York: Pergamon Press. 
 
Cooter, R. (1998). Expensive law and economics. Journal of Legal Studies, 27, 
585-608. 
 
Cowen, T. (1988). Public goods and market failures: A critical examination. 
Fairfax, VA: George Mason University Press. 
 
Dawes, R. M. (1980). Social dilemmas. Annual Review of Psychology. 31, 169-
193. 
 
Dillman, D. (1970). Relations between social agencies: A preliminary attempt at 
measurement and analysis. Paper presented at 65th Annual Meeting of the American 
Sociological Association. New York.    
 
 Dynes, R. R. & Quarantelli, E. L. (1980). Helping behavior in large scale 
disasters. In D. H. Smith & J. Macaulay (Eds.), Participation in social and political 
activities, (pp. 339-354), San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.   
 
Ellickson, R. C. (2001). The evolution of social norms: A perspective from the 
legal academy. In M. Hechter & K. Opp (Eds.), Social norms, (pp. 35-75). New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation.  
 
 Elster, J. (1985). Rationality, morality, and collective action. Ethics, 96, 136-155.  
 
 Elster, J. (1989). Social norms and economic theory. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 3, 9-117.  
 
112
  
Erev, I. & Rapoport, A. (1990). Provision of step-level public goods: The 
sequential contribution mechanism. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 34, 401-425. 
 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). (2000). Project Impact: 
Identifying and reporting partner contributions. Reported to the Chairman, 
Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, 
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. 
 
Finkel, S. E. & Muller, E. N. (1998). Rational choice and the dynamics of 
collective political action: Evaluating alternative models with panel data. American 
Political Science Review, 92, 37-49. 
 
Finkel, S. E., Muller, E. N., & Opp, K. (1989). Personal influence, collective 
rationality, and mass political action. American Political Science Review, 83, 885-903. 
 
Flanagan, W. (1993). Contemporary urban sociology. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
 Fritz, C. E. (1961). Disaster. In R. K. Merton & R. A. Nisbet (Eds.), 
Contemporary social problems (pp. 651-694). New York: Harcourt.   
 
Galaskiewicz, J. (1985). Interorganizational relations. Annual Review of 
Sociology, 11, 281-304. 
 
Geis, D. E. (June, 1996). Creating sustainable and disaster resistant communities. 
Smart communities network: Disaster planning articles/ publications. 
http://www.sustainable.doe.gov/articles/CREATING.shtml. 
 
Geis, D. E. (2000). By design: The disaster resistant and quality-of-life 
community. Natural Hazards Review, 1, 151-160. 
 
Giddens, A. (1972). Emile Durkheim: Selected writings. London: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Gillespie, D. F. (1991). Coordinating community resources. In T. E. Drabek & G. 
J. Hoetmer (Eds.), Emergency management: Principles and practice for local 
government (pp. 55-78). Washington, DC: International City Management Association.  
 
Gillespie, D. F., Colignon, R. A., Banerjee, M. M., Murty, S. A. & Rogge, M. 
(1993). Partnerships for community preparedness. Program on Environment and 
Behavior Monograph 54, Boulder, CO: Institute of Behavioral Science, University of 
Colorado. 
 
113
  
Godschalk, D. R., Beatley, T., Berke, P., Brower, D. J., & Kaiser, E. J. (1999). 
Natural hazard mitigation: Recasting disaster policy and planning, Washington, DC: 
Island Press. 
 
Granovetter, M. (1978). Threshold models of collective behavior. American 
Journal of Sociology, 83, 1420-1443. 
 
 Gulati, R. (1995). Social structure and alliance formation patterns: A longitudinal 
analysis. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40, 619-652. 
 
Gupta, D. K. (1994). Decisions by the numbers: An introduction to quantitative 
techniques for public policy analysis and management, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice 
Hall Inc. 
  
Hamilton, J. T. (1992). Politics and social costs: Estimating the impact of 
collective action on hazardous waste facilities. The RAND Journal of Economics, 24, 
101-125. 
 
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162, 1243-1248.  
 
Harrison, G. W. & Hirshleifer, J. (1989). An experimental evaluation of weakest 
link/ best shot models of public goods. Journal of Political Economy, 97, 201-225. 
 
Heckathorn, D. D. (1989). Collective action and group heterogeneity: A 
longitudinal analysis. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40, 619-652. 
 
Heckathorn, D. D. (1993). Collective action and group heterogeneity: Voluntary 
provision versus selective incentives. American Sociological Review, 58, 329-350. 
 
Henstra, D. (2003). Federal emergency management in Canada and the United 
States after 11 September 2001. Canadian Public Administration, 46, 103-116. 
 
Horne, C. (2001). Sociological perspectives on the emergence of social norms. In 
M. Hechter & K. Opp (Eds.), Social norms (pp. 3-34). New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation.  
 
Hull, R. B., & Wenger, D. E. (1992). Relationship among voluntary evacuation 
and place attachments: Charleston after Hurricane Hugo. College Station, TX.: Hazard 
Reduction and Recovery Center, Texas A&M University. 
 
Hunt, R. J., Krabbenhoft, D. P., & Anderson, M. P. (1996). Groundwater inflow 
measurements in wetland systems, Water Resources Research, 32, 495-508. 
 
 
114
  
James, L. R., James, L. A., & Ash, D. K. (1990). The meaning of organizations: 
The role of cognition and values. In D. Schneider (Ed.), Organizational climate and 
culture (pp. 40-84). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.  
 
 Kerlinger, F. N. & Lee, H. B. (2000). Foundations of behavioral research, fourth 
edition. New York: Harcourt College Publishers. 
 
 Klandermans, B. (1984). Mobilization and participation: Social-psychological 
expansions of resource mobilization theory. American Psychological Review, 49, 583-
600.  
 
Klandermans, B. (1992). Persuasive communication: Measures to overcome real-
life social dilemmas. In W. B. G. Liebrand, D. M. Messick, & H. A. M. Wilke (Eds.), 
Social dilemmas: Theoretical issues and research findings (pp. 307-318). New York: 
Pergammon Press.  
 
Knoke, D. (1988). Incentives in collective action organization. American 
Sociological Review, 53, 311-329.  
 
Kreps, G. & Bosworth, S. (1994). Organizing, role enactment, and disaster : A 
structural theory. Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press 
 
Krimm, R. W. (1998). Making mitigation a reality. Australian Journal of 
Emergency Management, 13, 60-64. 
 
Kunreuther, H. & Roth, Sr. R. J. (1998). Paying the price: The status and role of 
insurance against natural disasters in the United States. Washington, DC: Joseph Henry 
Press. 
 
Larson, L. & Plascencia, D. (2001). No adverse impact: New direction in 
floodplain management policy. Natural Hazards Review, 2, 167-181. 
 
 Lindell, M. K. (1994). Are local emergency planning committees effective in 
developing community disaster preparedness. International Journal of Mass 
Emergencies and Disasters, 12, 159-182. 
 
Lindell, M. K., Alesch, D., Bolton, P. A., Greene, M. R., Larson, L. A., Lopes, R.  
May, P. J., Mulinis, J., Nathe, S., Nigg, J. M., Palm, R., Pate, P., Pine, J., Tubbesing, S. 
K., & Whitney, D. J. (1997). Adoption and implementation of hazard adjustments.  
International Journal of Mass Emergency and Disasters, 15, 327-388.  
 
Lindell, M. K. & Perry, R. W. (1999). Household adjustment to earthquake 
hazard: A review of research. Environment and Behavior, 32, 590-630. 
 
115
  
Lindell, M. K. & Whitney, D. J. (1995). Effects of organizational environment, 
internal structure, and team climate on the effectiveness of local emergency planning 
committees. Risk Analysis, 15, 439-447. 
 
Lubell, M. (2002). Environmental activism as collective action. Environment & 
Behavior, 34, 431-454. 
 
 Marsh, W. M. (1998). Landscape planning: environmental applications. New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
 
May, P. J. & Burby, R. J. (1997). Making governments plan: State experiments in 
managing land. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.   
 
May, P. J. and Williams, W. (1986). Disaster policy implementation: Managing 
programs under shared governance. New York: Plenum Pub Corp. 
 
McEntire, D. A. (2000). Sustainability or invulnerable development? Proposals 
for the current shift in paradigms. Australian Journal of Emergency Management. 15, 
58-61. 
 
McPhail, C. (1971). Civil disorder participation: A critical examination of recent 
research. American Sociological Review, 36, 1058-1073. 
 
Mileti, D. S. (1999). Disaster by design: A reassessment of natural hazards in the 
United States. Washington, DC: Joseph Henry Press. 
 
Mileti, D. S. & O’Brien, P. (1991). Public response to the Loma Prieta 
Earthquake emergency and aftershock warnings: Findings and lessons. Fort Collins, 
CO: Hazards Assessment Laboratory, Colorado State University. 
 
Mitchell, T. R. (1974). Expectancy models of job satisfaction, occupational 
preference and effort: A theoretical, methodological and empirical appraisal. 
Psychological Bulletin, 81, 1053-1077. 
 
Mitchell, J. T. & Thomas, D. S. K. (2002). Trends in disaster losses. Chapter 5 in 
American hazardscapes: The regionalization of hazards and disasters. Washington, DC: 
Joseph Henry Press. 
 
 Morbley, W. H. (1977). Intermediate linkage in the relationship between job 
satisfaction and employee turnover. Journal of Applied Psychology, 62, 237-240. 
 
 Morrison, D. E. & Tillock, H. (1979). Group size and contributions to collective 
action. Research in social movements, conflicts, and change, Vol 2. Greenwich, CN: JAI 
Press. 
116
  
 
Mulford, C. L. (1984). Interorganizational relations: Implications for community 
development. In A. Etzioni (Ed.), Center for policy research monograph series 4. New 
York: Human Science Press, Inc.  
 
            Nagel, J. H. (1987). Participation. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
 
National Research Council. (1991). A safer future: Reducing the impacts of 
natural disasters. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 
 
National Research Council. (1999). The impacts of natural disaster: A 
framework for loss estimation. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 
 
 Nigg, J. M., Riad, J. K., Wachtendorf, T., Tweedy, A., & Leshaur, L. (1998). 
Disaster resistant communities initiative: Evaluation of the pilot phase. Prepared for the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency. Disaster Research Center, University of 
Delaware. 
 
 Norusis, M. J. (2000). SPSS 10.0 guide to data analysis, Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
 
Oberschall, A. (1980). Loosely structured collective conflict: A theory and an 
application. In L. Kriesberg (Ed.), Research in social movements, conflict and change 
volume 3 (pp. 45-68). Greenwich, CT: JAI. 
 
Oliver, C. (1990). Determinants of interorganizational relationships: Integration 
and future directions. The Academy of Management Review, 15,  241-265. 
 
Oliver, P. E. (1980). Rewards and punishments as selective incentives for 
collective action: Theoretical investigations. American Journal of Sociology, 85, 1356-
1375. 
 
Oliver, P. E. (1984). If you don’t do it, nobody else will: Active and token 
contributors to local collective action. American Sociological Review, 49, 601-610. 
 
Oliver, P. E. (1993). Formal models of collective action. Annual Review of 
Sociology, 19, 271-300. 
 
Oliver, P. E. & Marwell, G. (1993). The paradox of group size in collective 
action: A theory of the critical mass. III. American Sociological Review, 53, 1-8. 
 
Oliver, P. E., Marwell, G., & Teixeira, R. A. (1985). A theory of the critical mass 
I: Interdependence, group heterogeneity, and the production of collective action. 
American Journal of Sociology, 91, 522-556 
117
  
 
Olson, M. Jr. (1965). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory 
of groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Pfeffer, J. & Salancik, G. (1978). The external control of organization. New 
York: Harper & Row. 
 
Prater, C. (2001). The short history of Project Impact: A preliminary evaluation. 
College Station, TX: Hazard Reduction & Recovery Center, Texas A&M University.  
 
Prater, C. & Lindell, M. (2000). Politics of hazard mitigation. Natural Hazard 
Review, 1, 73-82. 
 
 Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American 
community. New York: Simon & Schuster.   
 
 Quarantelli, E. L. (1998). Major criteria for judging disaster planning and 
managing and their applicability in developing societies. Disaster Research Center, 
University of Delaware. Newark, DE.   
  
 Reddy, S. D. (2000). Examining hazard mitigation within the context of public 
goods. Environmental Management, 25, 129-141. 
 
Riker, W. & Ordeshook, P. (1968). A theory of the calculus of voting. American 
Political Science Review, 62, 25-42. 
 
 Roger, D. L. & Whetten, D. A. (1982). Interorganizational coordination: 
Theory, research, and implementation. Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press. 
 
Schwab, J., Topping, K. C., Eadie, C. C., Deyle, R. E., & Smith, R. A. (1998). 
Planning for post-disaster recovery and reconstruction. FEMA, American Planning 
Association, Planning Advisory Service (Report No. 483/484). 
 
Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of value: 
Theoretical advances and empirical test in 20 centuries.  Advances in Experimental 
Social Psychologies, 25, 1-65. 
  
Steers, R. M. & Porter, L. W. (1987). Motivation and work behavior: Fourth 
edition. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Taylor, M. (1976). Anarchy and cooperation. New York: Wiley. 
 
Taylor, V. (1978). Future directions for study. In E. Quarantelli (Ed.), Disasters: 
Theory and research (pp. 251-280). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.  
118
  
 
Taylor, V. (1994). An elite-sustained movement: Women’s right in the post-
World War II decades. In R. R. Dynes & K. J. Tierney (Eds.), Disasters, collective 
behavior, and social organization (pp. 281-305). Newark, DE: University of Delaware 
Press. 
 
Tierney, K. J. (2000). Executive summary: Disaster resistant communities 
initiative: Evaluation of the pilot phase II. Prepared for the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency. Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware. Newark, DE. 
 
Tornblom, K. & Johnson, D. (1985). Subrules of the equality and contribution 
principles: Their perceived fairness in distribution and retribution. Social Psychology 
Quarterly, 48, 249-261. 
 
Tulsa Project Impact. (2002). Building a disaster resilient community. Tulsa, OK. 
 
Turner, V. (1961). Ndembu divination its symbolism and techniques. Rhodes-
Livingstone Paper No. 31. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. 
 
Turner, R. H. & Killian, L. M. (1972). Collective behavior. Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
 
Twigg, J. (2001). Cooperate social responsibility and disaster reduction: A 
global overview. Benfield Greig Hazard Research Center, University College London. 
 
Victoria, L. P. (2002). Community based approaches to disaster mitigation. 
Regional workshop on best practice in disaster mitigation: Lessons learned from the 
Asian urban disaster mitigation program and other initiatives. Asian Disaster 
Preparedness Center. http://www.adpc.ait.ac.th/adpc_news2002.html. 
 
Voss, T. (2001). Game-theoretic perspectives on the emergence of social norms. 
In M. Hechter & K. Opp (Eds.), Social norms (pp. 105-136). New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation.  
 
Wachtendorf, T. (2001). Building community partnerships toward a national 
mitigation effort: Inter-organizational collaboration in the Project Impact initiative. 
Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware. Newark, DE. 
 
Wachtendorf, T., Connell, R., Monahan, B., & Tierney, K. J. (2002). Disaster 
resistant communities initiative: Assessment of ten non-pilot communities. Report to the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency. Disaster Research Center, University of 
Delaware. Newark, DE. 
 
119
  
Wachtendorf, T., Riad, J. K., & Tierney, K. J. (2000). Disaster resistant 
communities initiative: Focus group analysis. Report to the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency. Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware. Newark, DE. 
 
Wachtendorf, T. & Tierney, K. J. (2001). Disaster resistant communities 
initiative: Local community representatives share their visions:  Year 3 focus group final 
project report. Report to the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Disaster 
Research Center, University of Delaware. Newark, DE. 
 
 Wenger, D. E. & James, T. F. (1994). The convergence of volunteers in a 
consensus crisis: The case of the 1985 Mexico City Earthquake. In R. R. Dynes & K. J. 
Tierney (Eds.), Disasters, collective behavior, and social organization (pp. 229-243). 
Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press.  
 
White, G. F. (1974). Natural hazards, local, national, global. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Whitney, D. J. (1993). Organizational commitment in a voluntary organization. 
Unpublished Master’s Thesis. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University. 
 
 Wilson, J. Q. (1989). Bureaucracy: what government agencies do and why they 
do It. New York: Basic Books, Inc. 
 
Zey, M..(1998). Rational choice theory and organizational theory: A critique, 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
120
  
APPENDICES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
121
  
APPENDIX 1: Mail Survey Cover Letter 
 
 
 
Texas A&M University 
College of Architecture 
Landscape Architecture and Urban Planning 
November 17, 2003 
 
Dear Tulsa Project Impact Partners  
 
Tulsa Project Impact is one of the most active community-based hazard mitigation programs in the nation, the aim of 
which is to enable communities to protect themselves more efficiently and effectively against hazards. Thus, it is 
critical for stakeholders to participate in the program. We are conducting a study to examine the factors influencing 
the decision of participants in the Tulsa Project Impact to participate in this noteworthy endeavor to build a safer 
community.    
 
You are one of the participants we have selected to provide their opinions on this issue. We hope you will participate 
in our study, which will take approximately 10 minutes of your time. For the results to truly represent the thinking of 
partners, it is important that each questionnaire be completed and submitted as quickly as possible.     
 
In order to ensure anonymity, no names will be identified with questionnaires. Instead, an identification number will 
be used for mailing purposes only. This is so that we can remove your name from the mailing list when you submit 
your survey online. There are no risks associated with your participation, and, of course, you may refuse to answer any 
question that makes you uncomfortable. Your response is important for this study of citizen participation in 
community-based hazard mitigation/ disaster preparedness, so we hope you will choose to participate. 
 
This research has been reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board-Human Subjects in Research at 
Texas A&M University. For research related problems or questions regarding subjects’ rights, you can contact the 
Institutional Review Board through Ph.D. Michael W. Burkley, Director of Support Services, Office of the Vice 
President for Research at (979) 458-4067. 
 
Please mark your answers to all questions on the questionnaire. The online version of it is also available at 
http://archfile.tamu.edu/hlee/survey/loginpage.asp. If you want to receive a summary of the results of this study, 
please check up the box “study results requested” at the bottom of questionnaire. We thank you in advance for 
investing your valuable time in this study.    
 
If you have any questions, feel free to contact us. Thank you for your help. 
 
Sincerely yours, 
 
 
Hee Min Lee, Ph.D. Candidate 
Landscape Architecture and Urban Planning 
College of Architecture 
Texas A&M University, 3137 TAMU 
College Station, TX 77843-3137 
Email: huckfinn@neo.tamu.edu
 
Donald Sweeney, D.E.D. 
Associate Professor of Landscape Architecture and 
Urban Planning 
College of Architecture 
Texas A&M University, 3137 TAMU 
College Station, TX 77843-3137 
Email: dsweeney@archone.tamu.edu
Tell: (979) 845-7888 
 
College Station, Texas 77843-3137 • Tell: (979) 845-1046; Fax: (979) 845-5121; http://archone.tamu.edu/LAUP
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Collective Action 
for Community-Based Hazard Mitigation: 
Tulsa Project Impact 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of this survey is to examine the factors influencing the decision 
of Tulsa Project Impact partners to participate in this noteworthy endeavor 
to build a safer community. 
 
 
 
 
 
Hee Min Lee, Ph.D. Candidate, 
Department of Landscape Architecture and Urban Planning, 
Texas A&M University 3137, 
College Station, Texas 77843-3137 
Tell: (979) 845-1046 (Dept.) 
Tell: (979) 862-9303 (Home) 
Fax: (979) 845-5121 
E-mail: huckfinn@neo.tamu.edu
Website: http://archone.tamu.edu/LAUP
 
 
 
 
 
 
123
 APPENDIX 2 (continued) 
 
Please respond to all of the questions in this questionnaire. It will take you about ten minutes to fill out this 
questionnaire. If you have suggestions on any questions, people feel free to use the space in the margins. 
Thank you. 
 
 
1. Are you an individual member of Tulsa Project Impact or do you represent a certain group, community, or 
organization? …..…………………………………………………………………      Individual     Representative        
     
     If you answered that you are a representative member, then please respond to all questions.   
     If you are an individual member, please skip to the question 6 and answer all following questions.   
 
Organizational Profiles 
 
2. What is the best description of the original mission of your organization?   
 
      Community-Based Organizations       Education       Government      Health Care      Workforce   
      Industry & Business       Infrastructure: Transportation  ,   Utilities  ,   & Housing       Other _______________ 
 
3. What year did your organization join the Project Impact program? …..…….……………….……………..    _____ 
 
4. What is your best estimate of the number of people who are working for your organization? …………...    _____ 
 
 
 
Yes No
  
5. Has your organization ever contributed the following monetary or in-kind resources 
to program activities since your organization joined Tulsa Project Impact? 
 
    a. Providing staff resources to support program activities ………………….. 
    b. Giving direct funding support to Tulsa Project Impact …...……………… 
    c. Offering materials needed to implement the Project Impact projects. …… 
    d. Loaning equipment needed to implement the Project Impact projects. …. 
    e. Affording your organization facilities to support program activities ……. 
     
     
     
             
             
 
Contributions to Tulsa Project Impact 
 
6. What is your best estimate of the number of hours per month you personally devote to Tulsa Project Impact 
activities? 
     
    a. Attending regularly scheduled meetings ………………………………………….. 
    b. Serving on subcommittees or task forces …………………………………………. 
    c. Attending events such as conferences or workshops held by Project Impact …….. 
    d. Attending education or training programs held by Project Impact ……………….. 
 
____hours per month 
____hours per month 
____hours per month 
____hours per month 
 
7. How many Tulsa Project Impact projects have you participated in since you joined the program? ………  _____ 
 
8. How many subcommittees or task forces have you served on since you joined the program? …………..… _____ 
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No 
contribution
 
Medium 
contribution
 
Major 
contribution
 
9. Indicate your personal level of contribution of the following monetary or in-kind 
resources to Project Impact program activities since you joined Tulsa Project Impact. 
 
   a. Donating money to support program activities ....…………..…….…..…………... 
    b. Sharing information with other partners for building a safer community. ……….. 
    c. Providing knowledge or skills needed to implement the Project Impact projects  
    d. Offering materials needed to implement the Project Impact projects. …………… 
    e. Loaning equipment needed to implement the Project Impact projects. ………….. 
 
   ?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
   ?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
   ?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
   ?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
   ?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
 
Problem Severity (the Perceived Level of Exposure and the Lack of Capacity)  
 
 
Not at 
all likely
 
Un- 
determined
 
Almost a 
certainty
 
10. How likely do you think it is that in the next ten years there will be natural 
disasters such as a flood, winter storm, or tornado that will cause: 
 
    a. Property loss to you, your relatives, or your neighbors. ……………………….….. 
    b. Injury to you, your relatives, or your neighbors. ….………………………………. 
    c. Business loss to you, your relatives, or your neighbors. ..……………………….... 
?    ?    ?    ?    ? 
?    ?    ?    ?    ? 
?    ?    ?    ?    ? 
 
 
Strongly 
disbelieve
 
Un- 
determined
 
Strongly 
believe
 
11. How much do you believe that Tulsa community is vulnerable to natural hazards 
due to the  following: 
 
    a. Many people still live within hazard prone areas. ……………………………..….. 
    b. Many buildings and structures are still located within hazard prone areas. ……… 
    c. Many utility facilities are still located within hazard prone areas. …………….…. 
    d. Many transportation facilities are still located within hazard prone areas. ………. 
    e. Many residents do not have home insurance. …………………………………..… 
    f. Many small businesses lack resources to adopt hazard adjustments. ………….… 
    g. Many buildings and structures are not elevated or retrofitted. ……………….….. 
    h. Tulsa community has limited number of resources for implementing mitigation 
plans. ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
i.  Tulsa community has limited amount of access to external resource sources. …… 
 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
 
Economic Benefits 
 
Strongly 
disagree
Un- 
determined
Strongly 
agree
 
12. Indicate your level of agreement with each of the following statements. 
 
    a. Investment in preventive actions will save money when a disaster strikes. ………. 
    b. No business is safe without building a safer community. …………………………. 
    c. The safer a community is, the more attractive it is for businesses. ……………..…. 
 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
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Personal, Group, and Program Effectiveness for Hazard Reduction 
 
Strongly 
disbelieve
 
Un- 
determined
 
Strongly 
believe
 
13. How much do you believe that Tulsa Project Impact can successfully reduce 
community vulnerabilities to natural hazards by: 
 
    a. Identifying local hazard mitigation needs and demands. ………………………...… 
    b. Providing a variety of program activities for hazard reduction. ………………....… 
    c. Efficiently and effectively coordinating local hazard adjustment efforts. …….…... 
    d. Prioritizing hazard mitigation projects based on local mitigation needs. ………..… 
    e. Mobilizing resources needed to implement hazard mitigation measures. …………. 
 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
Strongly 
disagree
Un- 
determined
Strongly 
agree
14. Indicate your level of agreement with each of the following statements.  
       
    a. The activity of a single person cannot reduce community vulnerabilities to 
hazards. ………………………………………………………………….……………..... 
    b. Working together is more effective than individually working for hazard 
reduction. …..…………………………………………………………….…………..….. 
    c. Every partner makes small contributions to building a safer community. …….…... 
    d. You can influence the decisions that make your community safer. ………….……. 
 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
 
Incentives 
 
Not 
at all
Un- 
determined
Very 
great extent
 
15. To what extent is your participation in Tulsa Project Impact due to the following? 
 
    a. You may receive an award for Project Impact related performance. …..………….. 
    b. Your neighbors may recognize that you are working hard to help build a safer 
community. …………………………………………………………………………..…. 
    c. Your family members will be proud of you for volunteering to build a safer 
community. …..………………………………………………………………………….. 
    d. You may learn about other partners' missions and tasks.  ……………………….... 
   e. You may learn hazard-related information. ………………………………. 
    f. You may learn hazard-adjustment related information. ………………….. 
     g. You may have an opportunity to exchange resources with other partners. ……….. 
     h. You may get financial assistance. ……………………………..………………….. 
     i. You may get technical assistance. ……………………………..………………….. 
 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
  
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
  
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
 
Obligation  
 
 
Strongly 
disagree
Un- 
determined
Strongly 
agree
 
6. Indicate your level of agreement with each of the following statements that you feel 
obliged to: 
 
    a. Take preventive actions for protecting your family members or property from 
disasters. ………………………………………………………………………………… 
    b. Participate in the decisions that make Tulsa community safer. .…………………..  
    c. Participate in hazard mitigation programs for building a safer community. ……… 
    d. Volunteer hazard mitigation program activities to help people or businesses at 
risk. ….………………………………………………………………………………….. 
    e. Participate in mitigation programs because your job is protecting people and 
property. ………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
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Expectation of Other Partners’ Contributions 
 
Strongly 
disbelieve
 
Un- 
determined
 
Strongly 
believe
 
17. How much do you believe that other partners should make contributions to Tulsa 
Project Impact program activities due to the following: 
 
    a. The fact that their contributions are good for all community members.  
    b. The fact that their contributions can help people or businesses at risk.  
    c. Fairness in sharing social responsibilities for building a safer community.  
    d. Fairness in sharing common mitigation goals for building a safer community.  
    e. Fairness in contributing time and resources to building a safer community.  
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
 
Participation Costs 
 
Strongly 
disagree
Un- 
determined
Strongly 
agree
 
18. Indicate your level of agreement with each of the following statements. 
 
    a. Project Impact meetings are too frequent. ……………………………………...…. 
    b. Project Impact meetings take too long. ………………………………………..….. 
    c. The meeting place is far away from your place of work. ……………………….… 
    d. There are too many mitigation projects to implement. ………………………..….. 
    e. Participation in the Project Impact program costs you too much money. ………… 
    f. Lack of emergency experience or knowledge costs you a great deal of time and 
effort. ...…………………………………………………………………………………. 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
 
?     ?     ?     ?     ? 
 
Background Information 
 
19. Please indicate your:  
 
    a. Age: _____years old       
    b. Gender:  ? Male  ? Female   
    c. Ethnic/rational identity:  ? African American  ? Caucasian  ? Hispanic   
                                                ? Asian or Pacific Islander  ? Others ________ 
 
20. What is your level of educational attainment?   
     ? Less then high school   ? High school/ GED   ? Some college/ vocational school   
     ? College graduate   ? Graduate/ professional school 
 
21. Your yearly household income before taxes last year. 
     ? Less then $14,000   ? $14,000-$24,999   ? $25,000-$34,999   ? $35,000-$44,999    
     ? $45,000-$54,999   ? $55,000-$64,999     ? $65,000-$74,999   ? $75,000-$99,999    
     ? Over $100,000       
 
22. How many years have you lived in your community?  _____ Years ______ Months 
 
Do you want to receive a summary of the results of this study?   Yes     No   
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